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1. ZONING AND PLANNING
A. Texas Supreme Court
HE Texas Supreme Court rendered an important decision in the area
of zoning and planning during the survey period, holding that a city
ordinance requiring that a developer either dedicate land or contrib-
ute money for the creation of neighborhood parks does not constitute a tak-
ing of private property for a public purpose without just compensation in
violation of the Texas Constitution.' In City of College Station v. Turtle
Rock Corp. 2 the court of appeals affirmed a grant of summary judgment in
favor of a developer on the grounds that the local ordinance at issue violated
the Texas Constitution and certain other Texas statutes.3 The ordinance
provided that a developer must either dedicate land for park purposes or
contribute cash, in lieu thereof, as a condition precedent to subdivision plat
approval.
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court first addressed the
constitutionality of the local ordinance, noting that although section 17 of
* B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Geary, Stahl & Spen-
cer, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Central State University; J.D., University of Oklahoma. Attorney at Law,
Geary, Stahl & Spencer, Dallas, Texas.
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1. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 prohibits the taking of private property for a public purpose
without adequate compensation unless the taking is accomplished pursuant to a reasonable
and proper exercise of the state's police power. See Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 9-
10, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478-79 (1934) (city not required to make compensation for losses occa-
sioned by valid exercise of police power); accord Edge v. City of Bellaire, 200 S.W.2d 224, 226
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1947, writ ref'd).
2. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 104 (Nov. 24, 1984).
3. 666 S.W.2d 318, 219 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984); see supra note 1. The
court of appeals in Turtle Rock also affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
developer on the basis of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1175 (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1984),
and TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6081e (Vernon 1970). 666 S.W.2d at 320-21. Article
1175, § 15 empowers home rule cities to appropriate, as necessary, private property for public
purposes and to take private property within or without the city limits for various purposes
including parks. Article 6081e applies to general law cities and provides that any incorporated
city may acquire by gift, devise, purchase or condemnation proceedings, lands for use as public
parks.
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the Texas Constitution 4 requires that adequate compensation be paid to the
landowner when private property is taken for a public purpose, all private
property is held subject to the valid exercise of the state's police power.5
Whether an exercise of the state's police power constitutes a taking for
which constitutional compensation is required is definitely a question of law
in Texas now,6 and the determination is made by the court only after a thor-
ough and careful analysis of all the facts. 7 The court examined two factors
in Turtle Rock in considering whether the ordinance was a valid exercise of
the state's police powers. First, the ordinance must be substantially related
to the public health, safety, and welfare and be adopted to accomplish a
legitimate goal.8 Second, the regulation must be reasonable and cannot be
arbitrary. 9 Cognizant of the presumption of reasonableness and validity at-
tributed to a city ordinance and the extraordinary burden resting upon the
party seeking to overcome that presumption, the court quoted its opinion in
Hunt v. City of San Antonio:10 "If reasonable minds may differ as to whether
or not a particular zoning ordinance has a substantial relationship to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare . . . the ordinance must
stand as a valid exercise of the city's policy power." 1 Concluding that rea-
sonable minds could differ as to whether the College Station ordinance was
substantially related to the public health, safety, and general welfare, the
court held that the court of appeals had erred in holding the ordinance un-
constitutional as a matter of law.12 In support of its decision the court cited
several cases from other jurisdictions interpreting similar statutes.13
4. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
5. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 104. See Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 9-10, 73
S.W.2d 475; 478-79 (1934); Edge v. City of Bellaire, 200 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1947, writ refd).
6. See Hunt v. City of San Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. 1971); Dupuy v. City of
Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 110 (Tex. 1965); City of Bellaire v. Lamkin, 159 Tex. 141, 143, 317
S.W.2d 43, 45 (1958).
7. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 104 (citing City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Tex.
1978) (no one test and no single rule for determination of valid exercise of police power)).
8. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 105; see also City of Waxahachie v. Watkins, 154 Tex. 206, 212,
275 S.W.2d 477, 481 (1955) (regulation is valid exercise of police power if reasonable minds
can differ as to whether it has a substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare); Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475, 481 (1934) (regula-
tion must be reasonable and fairly related to the need to protect public health, morals, safety,
or general welfare).
9. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 105; see also City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d
773, 778 (Tex. 1972) (ordinance must be reasonable); Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1,
11, 73 S.W.2d 475, 479 (1934) (ordinance must be reasonable in its operation).
10. 462 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. 1971) (extraordinary burden rests on party attacking city
ordinance).
11. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 105 (quoting Hunt, 462 S.W.2d at 539).
12. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 106. The court compared the donation of park land to requiring
donation of land for streets, which must increase proportionately with the concentration of
population. The court reasoned that the local ordinance was nothing more than "a regulatory
response to the needs created by the developer's use of the land. Id.
13. Id. at 105 (citing Associated Home Builders of the Great East Bay, Inc. v. City of
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 645, 484 P.2d 606, 616, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 640 (high density
developers may be required to dedicate more open space), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878
(1971); Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Kansas City v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832,
835 (Mo. 1977) (requirement for dedication of park land can be reasonable); Billings Proper-
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In reaching its decision in Turtle Rock, the court of appeals had relied on
its earlier decision in Berg Development Co. v. City of Missouri City.' 4 The
court of appeals interpreted the Berg decision as standing for the proposition
that the ultimate use of the dedicated property or cash contribution in lieu of
dedication must benefit the general public to be substantially related to the
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.15 The supreme court dis-
agreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that the College Station ordi-
nance did not benefit the community and further distinguished the instant
ordinance from the Berg ordinance because in Turtle Rock the city was re-
quired ultimately to use the cash contribution to provide neighborhood
parks.16 The supreme court, therefore, found that the ordinance in question
was at least constitutional on its face.
The supreme court also reversed the court of appeals' invalidation of the
College Station ordinance on statutory grounds.' 7 The lower court con-
cluded that article 1175 limited the power of College Station, as a home rule
city, 18 to appropriating and taking private property for a public purpose and
that the statutory use of such terms implied that some form of payment or
compensation for the property should be made.' 9 The lower court had rea-
soned that the College Station ordinance was inconsistent with the provi-
sions of article 1175 because it did not provide for compensation to the
developer and was thus invalid. 20 Citing the rule announced in its opinion in
ties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182, 184-85 (1964) (requiring devel-
oper to dedicate park land not abuse of police power); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18
N.Y.2d 78, 83, 218 N.E.2d 673, 674, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (1966) (dedication requirement
valid and enforceable); Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 905 (Utah
1981) (city has flexibility to deal creatively with municipal problems); Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448-49 (1965) (dedication requirement
proper exercise of police power), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966); see also MODEL LAND
DEV. CODE § 2-103(3) (1976) (the American Law Institute recognizes the propriety of dona-
tion ordinances for park land).
14. 603 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The
ordinance in Berg required the developer to dedicate land or contribute cash in lieu of dedica-
tion, but did not state a specific purpose for which the dedication of land or cash would be
used.
15. 666 S.W.2d at 321. The court of appeals reasoned that although an ordinance requir-
ing a dedication of property or public cash contribution for streets and waterworks bears a
substantial relationship to the health, safety, and welfare of the public, a required dedication of
land or cash for parks does not necessarily constitute a benefit to the community because in
some neighborhoods parks attract derelicts and criminals. Id.
16. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 105. The court stated that the failure of the Berg ordinance to
guarantee that the land or cash dedicated ultimately would benefit the developer or residential
homebuyers made the ordinance constitutionally defective. Id.
17. Id. at 107; see supra note 3 for discussion of the statutes alleged by the appellee as
prohibiting the action taken by the City of College Station.
18. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5 allows a munipality meeting the requirements of § 5 to have
full power of self government subject only to clear and express limitations on that power
promulgated by the Texas Legislature. See Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San Marcos,
523 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. 1975) (home rule cities have power of self government pursuant to
Texas Constitution, subject only to legislative limitations on that power, which must appear
with unmistakable clarity).
19. 666 S.W.2d at 321.
20. Id. at 322.
1985]
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Lower Colorado River Authority v. City of San Marcos,21 the supreme court
concluded that neither article 1175 nor article 608 le limits with unmistaka-
ble clarity the power of a home rule city to enact an ordinance similar to the
College Station ordinance and, therefore, the court of appeals' interpretation
of the statutes was incorrect. 22 Having decided that the College Station ordi-
nance was not unconstitutional on its face and that the city was not pre-
cluded from enacting the ordinance by legislative limitation, the supreme
court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the cause
to the trial court for a determination of whether the application of the ordi-
nance would be unduly harsh or create a disproportionate burden on the
appellee and thereby become unconstitutional in its application. 23
In Sharpstown Civic Association v. Pickett24 the Texas supreme court re-
viewed the enforceability of certain deed restrictions and held that the non-
residential use of one lot in a subdivision did not constitute a waiver of the
right to enforce a residential use restriction on an adjoining lot. 25 The prede-
cessor in title to the appellee had purchased two lots in 1969 and erected a
building on lot one. The building was used as an office for over ten years.
Lot two was occasionally used as parking space for several vehicles. The
appellee purchased lot one and lot two together in 1979 and erected a sign
stating that the lots would be the future site of a car wash. Appellant sought
to enforce the residential deed restrictions on both lots by enjoining the use
of such lots for any purpose other than residential use. Appellee argued that
any right to enforce the restrictions on either lot had been waived because of
the undisputed ten years of nonresidential usage of lot one, which had no
discernible boundary from lot two. The court reasoned that the lack of a
discernible boundary between lot one and lot two and the apparent common
usage of both was irrelevant to the issue of waiver because each lot was
separate and distinct from the other according to the recorded subdivision
plat. 26 Furthermore, waiver of deed restrictions can only be determined on
the basis of the use made of each separate lot. 27 The court also held that
although the right to enforce the residential restrictions on lot one had been
waived with respect to its use as a small office building, that waiver did not
extend to the property's usage as a car wash. 28 The court stated that the
waiver of deed restrictions as to a particular use of property does not waive
21. 523 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. 1975).
22. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 107.
23. Id. at 106. In determining whether the ordinance was arbitrary or unreasonable, on
remand the trial court was directed to consider evidence of the size of the lots in the proposed
subdivision, the economic impact of the application of the ordinance of the subdivision, and
the amount of open lands consumed by the proposed development. The supreme court stated
that the trial court should consider this evidence in light of the need for a park in the develop-
ment area and the benefit that would flow to the residents of the specific development from the
creation of the park. Id.
24. 28 Tex. Sup, Ct. J. 44 (Oct. 20, 1984).
25. Id. at 45.
26. Id.
27, Id. (citing Wade v. Magee, 641 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (plat controls divisions between lots)).
28. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 45.
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the right to enforce those restrictions against a use of the property that is
substantially different from the one that has been waived. 29 Accordingly,
the court granted an injunction prohibiting the use of lot one and lot two as
a car wash. 30
B. Fifth Circuit
In a landmark decision having far-reaching consequences in the zoning
and constitutional areas of Texas law, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held in Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne31 that mentally re-
tarded persons are a quasi-suspect classification for purposes of constitu-
tional analysis of state laws.32 The court held that it would apply an
intermediate level of scrutiny in examining zoning regulations that discrimi-
nate against such persons by requiring the issuance of a special use permit to
locate a group home for mentally retarded persons in an area zoned for
apartment houses.33 The court reasoned that mentally retarded persons
share enough characteristics with those of a suspect class34 to warrant
heightened scrutiny.35 Such characteristics include historical prejudices,
political powerlessness, and immutability or inability to cure the condition
that is responsible for the classification. 36 The court cited several cases from
other jurisdictions holding that mentally retarded persons are a quasi-sus-
pect class and that an intermediate level of scrutiny 37 should, therefore, be
29. Id. (citing Arrington v. Cleveland, 242 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1951, writ ref'd); Wilson Co. v. Gordon, 224 S.W. 703, 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1920,
writ dism'd)).
30. Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 45. The appellee also considered using the lots for a strip shopping
center and at the time of trial was using them as a car lot. The court enjoined appellee from
using the lots for either of these purposes. Id.
31. 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 427, 83 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1984).
32. 726 F.2d at 198.
33. Id. at 196-98. The ordinance in question specifically sanctioned the existence of
"[hiospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or aged, other than for the
insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts." Id. at 193-94 (emphasis in original).
34. The term "suspect class" refers to a particular classification given to a certain group of
persons that receive special treatment in determining whether a statute or regulation discrimi-
nates against them in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
provides that no person shall be denied due process of or equal protection under the laws of the
United States. If the statute or regulation has as its subject a suspect class then the court will
employ a standard of strict scrutiny in examining the statute to determine whether it discrimi-
nates against the subject class, and the statute will fall unless the government can demonstrate
that the statute or regulation has been carefully and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest. Plyer v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2396, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 801 (1982) (children of illegal
immigrants are suspect class); see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971)
(alienage is suspect class); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (race is suspect
class); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948) (national origin is suspect class).
35. 726 F.2d at 197.
36. Id. at 196-98. The court also stated that the denial of an important benefit such as the
capability of mentally retarded persons to assimilate into the community and overcome local
prejudice is a factor to be considered in determining the level of scrutiny to be employed. Id.
at 199; see Plyer v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2398, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 803 (1982) (in determining
the rationality of statute, court may take into account the costs to the nation and to innocent
victims.)
37. The intermediate level of scrutiny is higher than the rational basis test and lower than
strict scrutiny. Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473,
19851
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
applied in reviewing statutes that discriminate against such persons.3 8 To
satisfy intermediate scrutiny the classification must be substantially related
to a legitimate state objective and closely tailored to fit that objective; other-
wise, the classification is unconstitutional. 39 The court assumed that the
objectives cited by the city in support of the ordinance were legitimate, but
found that the means of accomplishing the state's objectives were vastly
overbroad and underinclusive. 4° Accordingly, the court held that the re-
quirement for a special use permit for group home housing of mentally re-
tarded persons violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment 4 1 and, therefore, was invalid.
42
C. Texas Courts of Appeals
In City of Rusk v. Cox 4 3 the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court voiding an ordinance that rezoned a 2.7-acre tract of land from
single-family residential use to general business use on the basis that the or-
dinance amounted to unlawful spot zoning.44 The area north and west of
the 2.7-acre tract was zoned for general business use, and south of the prop-
erty was a large residential area. The appellee alleged that the amendatory
zoning ordinance adversely affected the value of his adjoining property and
that no substantial change in conditions surrounding the subject property
had occurred, so the present usage was not worthless or of no benefit to the
490 (D.N.D. 1982). Strict scrutiny has been reserved for classifications such as race. Plyer v.
Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2398, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 803 (1982).
38. 726 F.2d at 196, 199-200 (citing J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (9th
Cir. 1983) (heightened scrutiny applied in reviewing statute requiring special use permit for
establishment of group home for former mental patients); Association for Retarded Citizens of
North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 490 (D.N.D. 1982) (intermediate scrutiny for classi-
fications discriminating against the mentally retarded). Contra Anderson v. Banks, 520 F.
Supp. 520 F. Supp. 472, 512 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (mentally retarded persons not a suspect class).
39. 726 F.2d at 196; see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 (1977) (statutory classifica-
tion must relate to a legitimate state purpose); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (inter-
mediate scrutiny requires that statute must serve important state objective and have a close fit
between the legitimate state objective and the statutory means of achieving it). See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1083 n.10 (1978) (for discussion of levels of
scrutiny).
40. 726 F.2d at 200.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
42. 726 F.2d at 201. The appellants had also alleged that the ordinance violated the Reve-
nue Sharing Act, which prohibits discrimination against "otherwise qualified" handicapped
people. 31 U.S.C. § 6716 (1983). The court declined to hold that the actions of the city
council in determining the location of group homes, and necessarily the ability of such homes
to receive federal grants, constituted a program or activity subject to the Revenue Sharing Act.
726 F.2d at 195.
43. 665 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. Id. at 235. Spot zoning occurs when a particular tract of land is singled out for differ-
ent treatment than surrounding tracts of land within the same general district. The Texas
Zoning Enabling Act requires uniformity of zoning, making spot zoning an impermissible
means of zoning. TEX. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 101 lb (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1983);
City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Tex. 1981); Hunt v. City of San Antonio, 462
S.W.2d 536, 540 (Tex. 1971); Weaver v. Ham, 149 Tex. 309, 318, 232 S.W.2d 704, 709 (1950).
Spot zoning is essentially "piecemeal zoning [which is] the antithesis of planned zoning." 665
S.W.2d at 235 (quoting City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Tex. 1981)); see 2 E.
YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 13-1, 13-6 (1978).
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public. The appellee argued that the ordinance was, therefore, arbitrary and
unreasonable and amounted to an unconstitutional exercise of the police
power.4 5 The city argued that the rezoning ordinance was not arbitrary and
unreasonable because it was merely extending an existing business zone.
The court noted that cases regarding spot zoning must be decided by an
independent examination of all of the relevant facts in the particular case46
and concluded that, in the instant case, the lack of changed conditions sur-
rounding the property was sufficient to support the city's rezoning of that
property.4
7
In addition to finding the city ordinance void, the trial court had also
permanently enjoined the city from taking any future action that would re-
sult in the rezoning of the property until the conditions and circumstances so
changed as to warrant a change in the zoning.48 The court of appeals held
this portion of the trial court's order to be error because courts may not
enjoin municipalities from conducting public hearings to consider changes in
existing zoning laws.49 The appellate court concluded that although zoning
ordinances are subject to judicial review and enforcement of an existing ordi-
nance found void may be enjoined,50 a court cannot interfere with the legis-
lative function until the illegal ordinance has been passed and judicial review
triggered. 51
In Zoning Board of Adjustment v. Graham & Associates52 the Amarillo
court of appeals held that when a homeowner delays appealing the issuance
of a building permit for six months after its issuance, and the recipient of the
permit has relied to its detriment on the permit's validity, the homeowner's
right to appeal the issuance of the building permit is barred as a matter of
law.5 3 The appellee had received a building permit to reconstruct a de-
stroyed nightclub that had operated for some time as a nonconforming use. 54
45. See City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. 1981) (arbitrary and unreason-
able rezoning ordinance is unconstitutional exercise of public power). In Tippitt the Texas
Supreme Court recognized that amendatory ordinances rezoning a single city lot are almost
always improper absent a significant change in condition or other unusual circumstances. Id.
at 177-78.
46. 665 S.W.2d at 235 (citing McWhorter v. City of Winnebago, 525 S.W.2d 701, 703
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (spot zoning determined on a case-by-case basis
with regard to the particular facts of each case)).
47. 665 S.W.2d at 236.
48. Id. at 238.
49. Id. at 237; see City of Farmers Branch v. Hawnco, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (courts have no authority to interfere with city's
exercise of legislative zoning function unless such exercise is arbitrary and unreasonable); see
also City of Bellaire v. Lamkin, 159 Tex. 141, 143-44, 317 S.W.2d 43, 45-46 (1958) (courts
reluctant to disturb decision made under police power by city).
50. 665 S.W.2d at 237; see Thompson v. City of Palestine, 510 S.W.2d 579, 582-83 (Tex.
1974) (enforcement of void ordinance enjoined); Hunt v. City of San Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536,
537 (Tex. 1971) (city enjoined from issuing permit for construction or use of property for any
purpose other than as allowed by original ordinance).
51. 665 S.W.2d at 237.
52. 664 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
53. Id. at 435. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1011g(d) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-
1983) requires that the issuance of a building permit be appealed within a reasonable time to
the board of adjustment. No specific time period for appeal is set forth in the statute.
54. A nonconforming use refers to a usage of property that is existing at the time a zoning
1985]
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The board of adjustment subsequently revoked the permit on the basis that
the costs of restoration exceeded seventy-five percent of the replacement cost
of the building.55 Because the building owner had spent approximately
$50,000 reconstructing the building during the interim between the issuance
of the permit and the filing of the appeal, he petitioned the district court for
a writ of certiorari requesting reinstatement of the building permit and an
order enjoining the board from revoking the permit.56 The court of appeals
affirmed the district court order reinstating the permit and granting the in-
junction on the authority of Gala Homes, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment.57 In
Gala Homes a fourteen-month delay in appealing the issuance of a building
permit was held to be an unreasonable time for appeal as a matter of law.58
Having concluded that the homeowner waived its right to appeal the issu-
ance of the building permit, the court in Graham & Associates held that the
board of adjustment was without jurisdiction to revoke the permit. 59
Several other courts of appeals decisions were rendered during the survey
period that do not necessitate lengthy discussion but, nonetheless, are wor-
thy of brief mention in an article addressing zoning and planning law. In
Develo-Cepts, Inc. v. City of Galveston6° the Houston court of appeals held
that a prospective corporate lessee had an insufficient interest in the property
at issue to confer standing to bring an action for damages against the city for
denial of a permit for the use of property. 6 1 The appellate court held that
ordinance is passed and is in conflict with the now applicable zoning ordinance classifying
what use may be made of the property. 2 J. METZENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING 1210 (1955). In
City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972), the Texas Supreme Court
defined a nonconforming use of land as a use that existed legally before the zoning restriction
became effective and that has continued to exist. Id. at 777. The Benners court also found that
a nonconforming use may be terminated under the police power of the government, but such
termination must be reasonable and bear a fair relationship to the objective sought. Id. at 777-
78.
55. A local ordinance of the City of Lubbock provides that improvements used in connec-
tion with a nonconforming use may not be rebuilt and operated in the nonconforming style if
the costs of restoration exceed 75% of the replacement cost of the improvements. 664 S.W.2d
at 432.
56. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 101 ig (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1983) sanctions an
appeal to the district court from an adverse decision of the board of adjustment.
57. 405 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
58. Id. at 167. The court in Graham & Associates found it intolerable to place the burden
on the recipient of a building permit either to proceed at its peril, to spend money on construc-
tion, or to await the outcome of an appeal for an unreasonable period of time. 664 S.W.2d at
435.
59. 664 S.W.2d at 437. The court reversed that portion of the lower court's decision
enjoining the revocation of the permit because the appellee had presented no evidence that the
board intended to disregard or interfere with the trial court's judgment. Id. at 436; see Sterrett
v. Bell, 240 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, no writ) (the judicial branch
should exercise caution in restraining the legislative branch from the performance of its du-
ties); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Gohmert, 222 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1949, no writ) (absence of evidence of intent to act in a manner injurious to party
seeking injunction requires denial of injunctive relief).
60. 668 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1984, no writ).
61. Id. at 794. The standing requirement is met only when the plaintiff has a justiciable
interest in the subject matter in litigation either personally or in a representative capacity.
Housing Auth. v. State ex rel. Velasquez, 539 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus
Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). According to State ex rel. Velasquez, as a general rule a person
has standing to sue if:
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because appellant lacked standing to sue the city for damages in connection
with its denial of the permit, the trial court was correct in refusing to allow
the appellant to amend its pleadings, 62 and the order dismissing the cause
was affirmed. 6
3
In Board ofAdjustment v. McBride64 the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's holding that the board of adjustment had abused its discretion in not
granting a variance 65 to a homeowner who had expended $75,000 on the
construction of a house that encroached into one of the city's building set-
back lines. 66 The court held that because the undisputed evidence showed
that the appellee would suffer hardship by virtue of having to demolish a
portion of his house, and since no public interest was adversely affected by
the grant of a variance, the board of adjustment erred in refusing to grant the
variance requested. 67 In Kircus v. London6 the court of appeals held that
the appellant lacked standing69 to challenge the constitutionality of a Texas
statute that required approval of a plat application by two-thirds of the ad-
joining property owners. 70 The court concluded that the appellant lacked
1) he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, some direct in-
jury as a result of the wrongful act of which he complains; 2) he has a direct
relationship between the alleged injury and claim sought to be adjudicated; 3) he
has a personal stake in the controversy; 4) the challenged action has caused the
plaintiff some injury in fact, either economic, ethic, recreational, environmental,
or otherwise; or 5) he is an appropriate party to assert the public's interest in the
matter, as well as his own interest.
Id. at 913-14.
62. 668 S.W.2d at 792-93. The court drew a sharp distinction between a lack of standing
and a lack of capacity to sue. Id. at 793. The court pointed to the case of Bluebonnet Farms,
Inc. v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass'n, 618 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), in which a corporation lacked capacity and standing to sue because it had not paid
franchise taxes and, therefore, lost its existence. The shareholders, however, could have cured
the incapacity to sue by amending the pleadings. 668 S.W.2d at 793.
63. 668 S.W.2d at 792. Although the appellant cited the case of Cleburne Living Center,
Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 195, for the proposition that a corporate challenger has
standing to litigate its Revenue Sharing Act anti-discrimination claims, it did not assert that
the statute requiring a special use permit for group homes housing the mentally retarded was
unconsitutional. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text. The court distinguished
Cleburne because the challenger in that case had a leasehold interest in the property affected by
the denial of the special use permit and the appellant in the instant case had only a verbal
agreement. 668 S.W.2d at 795.
64. 676 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
65. Pursuant to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1011 g(g)(3) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-
1983) the board of adjustment is authorized to vary zoning regulations when hardship exists
and the variance would not be contrary to the public interest.
66. Building setback lines generally prohibit the erection of improvements within a certain
distance of a right-of-way and are typically established by a municipality for purposes of uni-
form appearance in a residential area, safety, and preserving future areas to be acquired
through condemnation proceedings for additional right-of-way property.
67. 676 S.W.2d at 709.
68. 660 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983).
69. The Kircus court raised the issue of standing sua sponte and mentioned in a footnote
that although appellee did not object to the appellant's lack of standing at trial, standing can-
not be waived when a public interest is at stake and may be adversely affected. Id. at 872 n.3
(citing Texas Indus. Traffic League v. Railroad Comm'n, 633 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1982)).
70. 660 S.W.2d at 872; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 974a, § 5(c) (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1963-1983). The statute provides that certain property owners surrounding the property
subject to the plat application in certain situations must be given actual notice of a hearing
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standing because he had not yet been injured by the statute's application. 7'
In Troth v. City of Dallas7 2 Dallas and its board of adjustment sought to
compel a landowner to remove from his property a chain link fence that
violated zoned height restrictions. The landowner failed to appeal to the
district court from an unfavorable decision by the board of adjustment
within ten days following filing of the decision as required by statute.73 The
trial court granted summary judgment against the landowner based on his
failure to perfect a timely appeal, and the appellate court affirmed the judg-
ment, citing City of Lubbock v. Bownds,74 which held that timely filing is
necessary to activate the trial court's jurisdiction.75
II. EMINENT DOMAIN AND PUBLIC DEDICATION
A. Eminent Domain
The United States Supreme Court rendered a significant decision during
the survey period concerning the law of eminent domain. In Kirby Forest
Industries, Inc. v. United States7 6 the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Cir-
cuit's holding that the date of taking in a straight condemnation proceed-
ing77 is the date that the government deposits the award for the condemned
property into the court registry. 78 Consequently, no interest accrues or the
amount deposited for the period from the filing of the condemnation petition
to the date of the deposit. 79 The United States sought to acquire a 2,175.86-
concerning the plat approval. If a petition protesting the approval of such plat signed by over
20% of such property owners is presented to the city, then the city shall not approve the plat
application without the approval of 66 1/2% of such property owners. Id.
71. 660 S.W.2d at 872.
72. 667 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1011g (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1983).
74. 623 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
75. 667 S.W.2d at 156.
76. 104 S. Ct. 2187, 81 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984).
77. The government generally uses one of two methods to appropriate private property
for a public purpose: (1) it acts under the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. § 258(a)
(1982), which vests title to the property in the United States immediately upon a filing of
declaration and deposit with the court of an amount determined to be an appropriate award
for the property; or (2) it proceeds in straight condemnation by filing a complaint in condem-
nation pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 257 (1982), whereby a panel determines the offering price for
the landowner's property but title does not vest in the United States until the government
decides to acquire the property and deposits the determined amount into the court. Because
title vests in the United States automatically when a declaration is filed under § 258(a), the
government is generally limited to using this section in cases of sudden emergency. Kirby, 104
S. Ct. at 2190-91, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 6-7; see also United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d
800, 801-12 (5th Cir. 1983) (just compensation held to be fair market value at date of taking
plus interest). In extreme emergencies Congress may exercise a third method of condemnation
by appropriating the property immediately and vesting title in the United States. This method
is referred to as a legislative taking and is authorized pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 79e(b) (1982).
78. United States v. 2,175.86 Acres of Land, 696 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 357. But see United States v. 15.65 Acres of Land, 689 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1982) (condemnation of unimproved property under 40 U.S.C. § 257 (1982) entitles landowner
to interest on award for period prior to the date award is paid and the date title passes to
government because landowner is denied economic use of land), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041
(1983); see also United States v. 156.81 Acres of Land, 671 F.2d 336, 340 (9th Cir.) (making
the date of judgment the date of taking encourages government to act promptly since interest
begins to accrue at that date), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982).
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acre tract of land from the appellant as part of the Big Thicket National
Park in eastern Texas by filing a complaint in condemnation pursuant to
statute.80 The district court appointed a commission to determine the award
to be paid to appellant 8 ' and, thereafter, entered judgment awarding the ap-
pellant the amount recommended by the commission plus interest at the rate
of six percent from the date of filing the complaint to the date that the gov-
ernment deposited the award with the court. The district court stated that
the institution of condemnation proceedings had denied the appellant any
economic use of its property and, therefore, a taking had occurred as of that
date.
In determining what constitutes just compensation for a taking of private
property as required by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court stated that identifying the time that a taking of a
tract of land occurs is crucial. 82 The Court held that, absent a substantial
interference with appellant's property interest, the date upon which the gov-
ernment tenders payment for the condemned property is the date upon
which a taking occurs under the statute. 83 The Court emphasized that pur-
suant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 71A(i)(2) and 71A(i)(3) 84 the
United States may dismiss condemnation proceedings after the valuation
hearing. 85 The Court also stated that withdrawal by the government would
be difficult to explain if the taking were deemed to occur at the point sug-
gested by the trial court. 8
6
The Court agreed with petitioner, however, that an award based on the
valuation of the property as of the date the complaint is filed does not ade-
quately compensate the landowner and, therefore, violates the fifth amend-
ment when a substantial delay occurs between the date of valuation and the
date the award is deposited with the court.87 The Court affirmed the judg-
80. 40 U.S.C. § 257 (1982).
81. Section 257 provides that after the complaint is filed by the government, the district
court shall appoint a commission to hold a valuation hearing for purposes of ascertaining the
value of the property to be condemned and, correspondingly, the amount to be awarded to the
landowner. Id.
82. 104 S. Ct. at 2194, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 11.
83. Id. at 2195, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 12; see supra note 77. The Court reasoned that substantial
interference had not occurred because the government had not forbidden the petitioner from
cutting trees or selling the property. Id. The Court recognized that the attractiveness of the
property to a prospective buyer was substantially reduced, but stated that impairment of the
market value of private property as a result of otherwise legitimate governmental action does
not constitute a taking that requires constitutional compensation. Id.; see, e.g., Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980) ("Mere fluctuations in value during the process of
governmental decision-making, absent extraordinary delay, are 'incidents of ownership' ");
Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939) (mere legislative enactment does not con-
stitute a taking because such legislation may be repealed or modified). See generally Geary &
Davenport, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 463, 475-76
(1984) (discussing Danforth v. United States).
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(i)(2), (3).
85. 104 S. Ct. at 2195 n.18, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 12 n.18.
86. Id. at 2195, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 12.
87. Id. at 2196-97, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 12-13. The commission's evaluation was given as of




ment of the court of appeals with instructions on remand to the district court
to permit the petitioner to present evidence pertaining to any appreciation in
the market value of the property between the date of valuation and the date
of the taking.88
In Perry v. Texas Municipal Power Agency 89 the Houston court of appeals
held that the appellant's removal of funds deposited into the court registry as
a condemnation award estopped him from challenging the right and author-
ity of the appellee to condemn his property. 90 Citing the Texas Supreme
Court decision in Coastal Industrial Water Authority v. Celanese Corp. ,91 the
court held that when a landowner accepts the award in a condemnation pro-
ceeding, he cannot later challenge the right of the condemner to take the
land.9 2 The appellant next challenged the sufficiency of the condemnation
award. The appellant argued that his testimony concerning allegedly sub-
stantial lignite deposits on the condemned property, which greatly enhanced
its value, should not have been excluded. The court held that the trial court
had properly ruled that appellant lacked the necessary qualifications to offer
such testimony as an expert commenting on market value. 93 The appellant
also had no personal knowledge of the amount or value of the deposits be-
cause his opinions were based on third-party hearsay statements. 94
88. Id. at 2198, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 15-16. The Court stated that FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
"empowers a federal court, upon motion of a party, to withdraw or amend a final order for
any. . . reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment'. This provision seems to
us expansive enough to encompass a motion, by the owner of condemned land, to amend a
condemnation award." 104 S. Ct. at 2198, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 16.
89. 667 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. Id. at 262. Texas Municipal Power Agency had deposited the sum of $98,000 into the
court as an award to be paid to appellant on passage of title to the agency. This sum was the
amount found by a special valuation commission to be the value of appellant's condemned
land. The court emphasized that the appellant had the unrestricted benefit of the use of the
deposited award. Id.
91. 592 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1979). In Coastal Indus. Water Auth. the Texas Supreme Court
held that although the appellee had timely objected to the award, the removal of the award
deposited with the court prevented appellee from litigating the authority's right to take the
property but not its right to contest the sufficiency of the award. Id. at 599-600; see also State
v. Jackson, 388 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. 1965) (withdrawal of award for condemnation consti-
tutes consent to taking); Luby v. City of Dallas, 396 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1965, writ refd n.r.e.) (withdrawal of money paid into court by condemner implies consent to
taking).
92. 667 S.W.2d at 262. The court also held that appellant's filing of a general denial failed
to raise the issue of appellee's right to condemn the property. Id. at 263; see TEX. R. Civ. P.
279.
93. 667 S.W.2d at 264-65. Expert testimony is admissible when the witness has been qual-
ified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education and is shown to pos-
sess a higher degree of knowledge as to the matter in issue than the jurors themselves possess.
Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tex. 1966) (stating experts are considered to have a
special knowledge not generally possessed by jurors); Ervia v. Gulf States, Inc., 594 S.W.2d
134, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (experts are allowed to
testify as to their opinions because they possess a special knowledge); see also 36 TEX. JUR. 3d
Evidence § 622 (1984) (discussing the qualifications of expert witnesses).
94. Testimony offered for the truth of the matter asserted is properly excluded as hearsay
when based on the statements or actions of a third party not available for cross examination.
Biddle v. National Old Time Ins. Co., 513 S.W.2d 135, 139-40 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); see UNIF. R. EvID. § 63. The court in Biddle held that even if a portion of appel-
lant's testimony was based on non-hearsay, no error was made in excluding the entire testi-
[Vol. 39
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
In Fort Worth & Denver Railway v. City of Houston95 the appellant alleged
that the city had no authority to condemn its right-of-way property because
such condemnation would destroy the property's existing use. The court
stated that: "[a]n authority seeking to condemn property already devoted to
public use may not do so if the effect would be practically to destroy its
existing use unless it shows that its intended use is of paramount public im-
portance and that its purpose cannot be otherwise accomplished. ' 96 The
court, however, held that appellant had failed to carry its burden of showing
that the condemnation would destroy the property's use as a railroad car
holding area and affirmed the trial court's grant of the easement to the city.97
The court of appeals rendered two other noteworthy decisions regarding
the condemnation of private property for pipeline easements operated by pri-
vate corporations. In Loesch v. Oasis Pipeline Co. 98 the appellant argued
that Oasis was not a gas utility as defined by statute9 9 and, therefore, did not
possess the constitutional authority to exercise the power of eminent do-
main. ° ° The Texas Constitution provides that private property may only be
condemned for a public use. 10 1 Appellant argued that because Oasis was a
private corporation selling gas to other private corporations, the proposed
taking was unconstitutional. The court cited the Texas Supreme Court case
of Borden v. Trespalacios Rice & Immigration Co. 102 for the proposition that
condemnation of private property for a public use is constitutional if the
corporation is given the power of eminent domain by statute and is "charged
with public duties."10 3 The court concluded that, by the very exercise of the
power of eminent domain, Oasis had acknowledged that it was a public cor-
poration having power of eminent domain and thereby submitted itself to
the onerous statutory provisions regulating public utilities in Texas. 104 The
court held that because Oasis had submitted itself to regulation as a public
utility, it was properly charged with duties to the public and, therefore, its
mony because no effort was made to segregate the hearsay evidence from the non-hearsay
evidence. 513 S.W.2d at 139-40; see Powell v. Powell, 554 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1977, writ refd n.r.e.); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Ellis, 421 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1967, no writ).
95. 672 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ refd n.r.e.). The opinion reported was
substituted by the court for an earlier withdrawn opinion.
96. Id. at 300; see The City of Houston v. Fort Worth & Denver Ry., 619 S.W.2d 234
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
97. 672 S.W.2d at 301.
98. 665 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
99. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1436 (Vernon 1980) provides that corporations that
transport and sell gas to the public within Texas shall have the power of eminent domain.
100. 665 S.W.2d at 596.
101. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 provides that private property may be taken only for a public
use.
102. 98 Tex. 494, 86 S.W. 11 (1905).
103. 665 S.W.2d at 597 (quoting Borden, 86 S.W. at 14).
104. 665 S.W.2d at 598. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6050 (Vernon Supp. 1984) pro-
vides that the regulatory provisions of articles 6050-6066 pertaining to a public utility, gas
utility, or a utility apply to a corporation owning or leasing pipelines in Texas for the transpor-
tation of natural gas, whether for public hire or not, if any part of the right-of-way line has
been acquired by eminent domain.
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exercise of the power of eminent domain was constitutional. 105
In Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Richards10 6 the appellant complained that
the trial court's admission of a hypothetical subdivision plat into evidence
was error and that a jury finding of $1,125 per acre as the value of the por-
tion of land not being condemned was without support in the evidence be-
cause the highest value testified to was $1,050 per acre. The court first let
stand the jury valuation of the remaining uncondemned property because
the jury is restricted only by the lowest figure testified to10 7 and is allowed to
use its own opinion with respect to evidence presented and matters of com-
mon knowledge. 108 With regard to the appellant's first contention, the court
held that the admission of the hypothetical plat came within an exception to
the rule forbidding use of hypotheticals for condemned raw land valuation;
the exception allows the use of hypothetical plats only for the limited pur-
pose of proving an outstanding issue in the case.109 The use of the plat was
held admissible to prove the allegation of appellee that the land was adapta-
ble to subdivision development and that such use was its highest and best
use. 110 Concluding that a portion of the uncondemned property had not
been damaged by the taking, the court affirmed the trial court's holding, but
reformed the judgment conditioned upon the filing of a remittitur for the
excess award presented by the undamaged property.I1'
105. 665 S.W.2d at 599. The effect of the court's holding is that if a corporation is success-
ful in condemning property for a pipeline easement used in connection with the transportation
of natural gas, it becomes subject to public utility regulation and, consequently, is charged with
public duties. This reasoning may be somewhat circular in that the corporation becomes
charged with public duties to the public only as a result of its successful condemnation of
private property.
106. 659 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ).
107. Id. at 865-55; see Maddux v. Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fe Ry., 293 S.W.2d 499, 506-07(Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (jury award limited only by lowest value
testified to).
108. 659 S.W.2d at 866; see Roberts v. State, 350 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1961, no writ) (jury may accept or reject opinion evidence or form its own opinion from the
evidence and by using its own experience in matters of common knowledge).
109. 659 S.W.2d at 864. The general rule is that evidence of a hypothetical plat of a nonex-
istent subdivision is not admissible to show that raw acreage may have speculative develop-
ment value. Kaufman N.W., Inc. v. Bi-Stone Fuel Co., 529 S.W.2d 281, 288 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that admitting into evidence a hypothetical plat
when condemned land is raw acreage is improper); Lower Nueces River Water Supply Dist. v.
Collins, 357 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating
evidence of hypothetical plat is inadmissible when subdivisions are nonexistent). An exception
to the general rule is recognized, however, when the hypothetical plat is relevant to prove some
issue in the case, such as adaptability of a party's land to subdivision development. Id.
110. 659 S.W.2d at 864. The value of land is generally determined for purposes of a con-
demnation award solely on the basis of its actual use unless additional evidence shows its
adaptability to another use of greater value. Calvert v. City of Denton, 375 S.W.2d 522, 525
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (value of property may be affected by use
to which it is readily convertible); 35 TEX. JUR. 3d Eminent Domain § 173 (1984).
111. 659 S.W.2d at 867. Remittitur is a method often used in condemnation cases as a
means of reducing the award, in lieu of granting a new trial, when the award is found exces-
sive. M. RAYBURN, TEXAS LAW OF CONDEMNATION § 226 (1960). TEX. R. Civ. P. 440
sanctions affirmance of a judgment conditioned upon the filing of remittitur. If no remittitur is
made, the court of appeals may reverse the judgment. Adams v. Houston Lighting & Power
Co., 158 Tex. 551, 314 S.W.2d 826, 830 (1958) (stating there is no rule that the trial court must
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B. Public Dedication and Abandonment
In Las Vegas Pecan & Cattle Co. v. Zavala County'1 2 the trial court and
the court of appeals held that the county was vested with legal and equitable
title to a right-of-way running over a portion of appellant's property that
appellant had attempted to close to public use. 1 3 The supreme court re-
versed both lower courts and held that although an implied dedication of the
road to the county arose, the courts had erred in holding that by virtue of
the dedication the county held legal title to the right-of-way property. 4
The court also rejected the county's contention that article 6812h,1 5 which
greatly restricts the ability to establish a public interest in a private road by
implied dedication or adverse possession, was retroactive and applied to the
instant case." 6 The court reasoned that because the county had shown an
implied dedication of the right-of-way prior to the effective date of article
6812h and because the statute contained no provision for retroactivity, the
statute could only have prospective application and was inapplicable to the
instant case. 17
In Spin uzzi v. Town of Corinth18 the appellants argued that the trial court
erred in granting the town's motion for summary judgment on the issue of
implied dedication and in issuing an injunction requiring appellant to re-
move a gate barring access to the disputed roadway. The town contended
that the motion was properly granted despite the fact that no evidence was
presented that a previous owner of the roadway had ever dedicated it to the
public or that such a dedication had ever been accepted. This contention
was based on the town's assumption that the case came within the well-
settled rule that when the origin of the use of a road by the public and the
follow in determining remittitur); Carter v. Texarkana Bus Co., 156 Tex. 285, 295 S.W.2d 653,
653 (1956) (if judgment is excessive court of appeals may allow filing of remittitur).
112. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. . 169 (Dec. 22, 1984).
113. Appellant had originally sued the county commissioners and sheriff of Zavala County
to enjoin them from interfering with his attempts to close the road. The trial court denied the
injunction and held that Zavala County owned the road because it had been impliedly dedi-
cated to public use by the landowners. The court of appeals affirmed and appellant appealed to
the supreme court, complaining only of the holding that the county held legal and equitable
title to the road and not of the denial of injunctive relief. 669 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio), rev'd, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 169 (Dec. 24, 1984).
114. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 171. An implied dedication of a private road occurs when a
party can show that (1) the acts of the landowner induced the belief that the landowner in-
tended to dedicate the road to public use; (2) the landowner was competent to dedicate the
land, because he had the capacity and fee simple title; (3) the public relied on such acts and
will benefit from the dedication; and (4) the dedication was accepted. Id.; O'Connor v. Gragg,
324 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959), reformed, 161 Tex. 273, 339 S.W.2d
878 (1960).
115. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6812h (Vernon Supp. 1985).
116. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 170. TEX, REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6812h (Vernon Supp.
1985) provides that a public interest in a private road may be established only by purchase,
condemnation, dedication, or adverse possession.
117. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 170; see also Lindner v. Hill, 673 S.W.2d 611, 615-16 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1984, writ granted) (article 6812h held not to have retroactive application
and implied dedication prior to the effective date of the article was established by the evidence
presented at trial).
118. 665 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
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ownership of the land at the time of such use are so shrouded in obscurity
that no proof can be adduced to show the intention of the owner when the
public use began, the law presumes an intention to dedicate the land to pub-
lic use.' 19 Although the court agreed that the facts of the case came within
the foregoing presumption, it held that summary judgment was improper
because conflicting statements were made in the supporting affidavits as to
the use and maintenance of the road by the public. 120 The court further held
that the appellant had also raised a fact issue as to whether the public had
abandoned its interest in the road, even assuming that a previous implied
dedication had occurred. 121 The cause was, accordingly, remanded to the
trial court for a trial on the merits in accordance with the court's opinion. 122
III. TORT LIABILITY
A. Texas Tort Claims Act
The Texas courts of appeals rendered a number of significant decisions
during the survey period interpreting the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA). 123
In Green v. City of Dallas 24 a widow brought suit against the city alleging
that the death of her husband resulted from the city's failure properly to
administer cardiovascular treatment after he had suffered a heart attack.
Responding to an emergency call from the widow whose husband was exper-
iencing heart pains, two emergency medical technicians of the Dallas Fire
Department examined the husband, diagnosed his condition as simple physi-
cal overexertion resulting from a basketball game, and declined the widow's
request to transport her husband to the hospital. The paramedics were sum-
moned again only five minutes later when the husband experienced a serious
heart attack, from which he died en route to the hospital. The appellant
sued the City of Dallas under section 3(b) of the TTCA, alleging negligent
care in the treatment of her husband.125 Section 3(b) of the TTCA has been
119. Id. at 532; see, e.g., O'Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273, 339 S.W.2d 878, 882 (1960);
Compton v. Thacker, 474 S.W.2d 570, 572 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dunn
v. Deusson, 268 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
120. 665 S.W.2d at 533; Wesson v. Jefferson Say. & Loan Ass'n, 641 S.W.2d 903, 905-06
(Tex. 1982) (summary judgment only proper when evidence establishes as a matter of law no
genuine issue of material fact as to one or more elements of plaintiff's cause of action); accord
Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1970).
121. 665 S.W.2d at 533-34.
122. Id. at 535. Abandonment of a private road previously dedicated to the public is
shown when the use for which the road was originally dedicated is impossible or so improbable
as to be practically impossible. Id. at 534; Compton v. Thacker, 474 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ refd n.r.e.). The Spinuzzi court also stated that abandonment is
an affirmative defense and the burden of producing evidence of abandonment rests on the party
availing itself of such defense. 665 S.W.2d at 533; County of Calhoun v. Wilson, 425 S.W.2d
846, 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christ 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Maples v. Henderson
County, 259 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, writ refd n.r.e.).
123. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1984).
124. 665 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
125. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3(b) (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1984) pro-
vides in part that a governmental unit shall be liable only when an injury is caused by some
condition or use of tangible property under circumstances in which such unit of government, if
a private person, would be liable to the claimant.
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held to waive governmental immunity in three general areas: (1) injuries
from use of publicly owned automobiles; (2) injuries from defects in publicly
owned premises; and (3) injuries arising out of some conditions or use of
public property.1 26 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the city, holding that no waiver was made of governmental immunity under
the TTCA for a failure to use, rather than to misuse, public property.1
27
The court of appeals found that the record contained some evidence from
which the jury could properly conclude that a negligent use of public prop-
erty contributed to the husband's injury. 128  The court cited the supreme
court's opinion in Lowe v. Texas Tech University129 as support for its conclu-
sion that when a governmental unit uses or provides use of an item of per-
sonal property, injuries resulting from the failure to provide or use an
integral component part of the larger unit will support a cause of action
under section 3(b) of the TTCA.1 30  Having concluded that the trial court
erred in holding as a matter of law that governmental immunity was not
waived, the court remanded the cause for trial.
1 3 1
In Finnigan v. Blanco County132 a deceased woman's husband appealed
from a grant of summary judgment rendered against him in a negligence suit
126. Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. 1983). The third basis of
waiver has caused great confusion for Texas courts in recent years. The issue is primarily
whether the language extends to negligent use of public property regardless of whether the
property contains some defective condition. Chief Justice Greenhill of the Texas Supreme
Court stated in his concurring opinion in Lowe v. Texas Tech. Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 301
(Tex. 1976) (Greenhill, C.J., concurring), that the statutory language "condition or use of
property" implies that it should be applied to cases in which the property furnished was in bad
or defective condition or was wrongly used. Id. at 302. As of this date, the supreme court has
held that the language of § 3 does waive governmental immunity for negligent or wrongful use
of public property. Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d at 32; accord Lowe v. Texas
Tech. Univ., 540 S.W.2d at 300 (failure to furnish knee brace for football uniform supports
cause of action under § 3 of TTCA). See generally Geary & Davenport, Local Government
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 463, 487-88, 489 n.185 (1984); Greenhill &
Murto, Governmental Immunity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 462, 468 (1971).
127. The majority and the dissent's interpretation of the theory relied on for relief by the
plaintiff in Green are inconsistent. The majority relied upon the fact that the record revealed
that public property was used, namely a flashlight and a cardiac monitor. The dissent, how-
ever, forcefully stated that the theory relied upon by the plaintiff in Green was the failure of the
city to use, not misuse, the public property.
128. 665 S.W.2d at 570.
129. 540 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex. 1976); see supra note 126.
130. 665 S.W.2d at 569. Although the majority in Green expressly stated that the issue was
not a failure to use public property, its holding that the failure of a governmental unit to use or
provide an integral component part of a larger unit will support a § 3(b) claim seems to sup-
port a contrary conclusion.
131. Id. at 570. The dissent in Green argued that the case must be viewed as a non-use
case. Id. (Osborn, J., dissenting). Although the dissent expressed sympathy with the appel-
lant's argument that no distinction between the negligent use of public property and the failure
to use public property should be made, it concluded that the addition of a failure to use public
property as a basis for waiver of immunity under § 3(b) is a legislative, not judicial, function.
Id. at 571. The decision in Green appears to add only a newer shade of gray to what is already
a confusing area of law concerning when § 3(b) of the TTCA waives sovereign immunity. See
supra note 126; see also Hale v. Sheikholeslam, 724 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1984) (personal
property that causes an injury need not be defective to fall within § 3(b) of the TTCA and
allegation of misuse will state a cause of action pursuant to § 3).
132. 670 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
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against Blanco County. The appellant alleged that the wrongful death of his
wife resulted from the county sheriff's actions in leaving a police car running
near the county jail yard. The car was stolen by an inmate who was involved
in a high speed chase that resulted in the wife's death. The appellant argued
that the county was negligent in the "operation and use of a motor driven
vehicle" and, therefore, sovereign immunity had been waived under section
3(b) of the TTCA.133 The court of appeals held that the operation and use
of a motor driven vehicle as contemplated by section 3(b) necessarily in-
cluded the act of stopping and leaving that vehicle attended., 34 Having held
that the appellant had stated a cause of action under section 3(b) of the
TTCA, the court reversed the summary judgment order on the basis that
fact issues of foreseeability and proximate causation were raised by the evi-
dence presented. 135
In Smith v. University of Texas' 36 an unpaid volunteer worker at a univer-
sity track and field event was struck in the head and seriously injured by a
shot thrown during a shot-put competition held at the University of Texas at
Austin (UT). The worker alleged that UT failed to supervise properly the
shot-put event and that such negligent supervision amounted to a negligent
or wrongful use of public property under section 3(b) of the TTCA. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UT on the basis that negli-
gent supervision of the use of public property does not constitute the negli-
gent use of that property for purposes of immunity waiver under section
3(b). UT argued on appeal that the grant of summary judgment was proper
on the following grounds: (1) allegations of negligent supervision over public
property do not state a cause of action against a governmental unit under
Texas law; (2) the person directly responsible for supervising the shot-put
event was not an officer or employee of a governmental unit within the
meaning of section 2(3) of the TTCA; 1 3 7 and (3) the worker failed to allege
that his injuries were the result of some defective condition or use of public
property.
The Austin court of appeals held that the worker properly stated a cause
133. Section 3(b) of the TTCA expressly waives sovereign immunity for injuries resulting
from the "operation and use of a motor driven vehicle." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-19, § 3(b) (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1984).
134. 670 S.W.2d at 316. The court cited Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30, 32
(Tex. 1983) in support of its rationale that such a conclusion was mandated by § 13 of the
TTCA, which provides that the provisions of the act should be liberally construed.
135. 670 S.W.2d at 318.
136. 664 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ). The decision was discussed in
Geary & Davenport, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 487,
489 n. 185 (1984). The authors, however, feel a more thorough discussion is warranted herein,
due to the significance of the issues raised in Smith, and have accordingly chosen to discuss the
case again more fully.
137. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 § 2(3) (Vernon 1970) provides that an of-
ficer, agent, or employee whose negligent acts may result in a waiver of governmental immu-
nity under § 3(b) includes every person who is in the paid services of any unit of government.
Id. UT argued that if the worker's injuries were a result of negligent supervision over the shot-
put event, then the injuries were attributable solely to the negligent supervision of a volunteer
agent of the university rather than a paid official and, therefore, a waiver of governmental
immunity did not result. 664 S.W.2d at 189.
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of action under section 3 of the TTCA by alleging that the failure of UT to
supervise properly the use of its real and personal property and to promul-
gate rules and regulations for the safety of the public with respect to the use
of such property resulted in the worker's injuries. 138 Incidental to that con-
clusion and based on the strength of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Salcedo v. El Paso Hospital District,139 the court concluded that appellant's
failure to allege that his injuries were the result of some defective condition
or use of public property was not fatal to his cause of action. 14 The court
reasoned that UT's negligent supervision over the use of its property consti-
tuted a negligent or wrongful use of that property under the Salcedo rule.141
Finally, the court concluded that UT could not avoid liability under the
TTCA by using an unpaid volunteer to supervise activities held on its prop-
erty, because a claim under section 3(b) can arise through the negligence of
an agent duly appointed by the governmental unit to carry out the duties of
a paid state employee.' 42
The Fifth Circuit rendered an interesting decision interpreting the TTCA
during the survey period. In Hale v. Sheikholeslam 143 the court held that
the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against a local hospital under
section 3(b) of the TTCA in connection with the alleged malpractice of a
staff-privileged doctor. 144 The court reasoned that the hospital could not be
liable under section 3(b) because the doctor who committed the malpractice
was not an officer or employee of the hospital within the meaning of section
3(b).'145 Since the doctor was not an officer or employee of the hospital and
the doctor's malpractice was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries,
the court ordered the judgment against the hospital reversed and
138. 664 S.W.2d at 188-89.
139. 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983) (allegation of defective or inadequate property is not neces-
sary to state cause of action under TTCA when some use of property, rather than condition of
property, is alleged to have contributed to injury); see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
140. 664 S.W.2d at 188.
141. Id. at 187-88.
142. Id. A great deal of evidence was presented to show that the volunteer official was
acting at the direction of several salaried employees of the university. Id. at 190; see also El
Paso Laundry Co. v. Gonzales, 36 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso, 1931, writ dism'd)
(volunteer worker will have the same status as paid employee when the employer directs the
volunteer's duties, has an interest in the volunteer's work, accepts benefits from the volunteer's
work, and has a right to replace the volunteer).
143. 724 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1984).
144. Id. at 1210.
145. Id. at 1208. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 § 2(3) (Vernon Supp. 1982), in
conjunction with § 3(b) of the TTCA, provides that the act or omission resulting in the waiver
of sovereign immunity under § 3(b) must be the result of the act or omission of an officer or
employee of a governmental unit. See supra note 137. In Hale the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the negligent actions of a doctor with staff privileges would not waive sovereign immunity
under the TI'CA because he was not an officer or employee of a governmental unit as required
by § 3; in Smith the court of appeals held that negligent supervision of the use of public prop-
erty would establish a cause of action under § 3 of the TTCA. A similar argument could have
been made in the Hale case; that is, the hospital may have been negligent in the supervision of
the use of its property by failing to properly supervise the actions of the doctor and such
negligent supervision amounted to a negligent use of public property. The court in Hale ex-
pressly rejected the plaintiff's argument that the hospital's failure to exercise reasonable care in




B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In Gay Student Services v. Texas A&M University,147 one of the more con-
troversial cases decided during the survey period, the Fifth Circuit held that
although Texas A&M University (TAMU) had deprived the appellant of its
rights under the first amendment to the United States Constitution,' 48 the
University was immune from a suit for damages brought by appellant under
section 1983149 by virtue of the eleventh amendment to the United States
Constitution. 150 The gay student organization (appellant) sought official
campus recognition by TAMU. 151 In a letter from the Vice President for
Student Affairs, TAMU denied official recognition to Gay Student Services
(GSS) on the basis that the organization was likely to incite illegal homosex-
ual behavior and that the goals of GSS to provide referral services, educa-
tional information, and speakers for the students were inconsistent with the
philosophy and goals of TAMU, because the provision of such services was
uniquely within the domain of the TAMU staff and faculty. GSS then filed
suit seeking declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief against TAMU
146. 724 F.2d at 1210. The court also interpreted the Texas Supreme Court's Salcedo
decision as standing for the proposition that use or misuse of nondefective property will sup-
port a claim of waiver under § 3(b) only if such use or misuse is the proximate cause of the
injury. Id. at 1208.
147. 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, No. 84-724 (U.S. S. Ct. April 1, 1985)
(available April 10, 1985, on WESTLAW, general library, SCt file).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the
states from enacting any law that shall abridge the right of the citizens of the United States to
freedom of speech, religion, and assembly. Id.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 has been interpreted to allow private citizens to sue states and local governing
bodies for deprivation of their constitutional rights. The United States Supreme Court held in
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that local governing bodies can be
sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief when the alleged
unconstitutional action "implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted or promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at 690.
150. 737 F.2d at 1333. The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that a state may not be sued by an individual resident of another state for monetary
damages in federal court absent a waiver of immunity by the state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
The United States Supreme Court has also held that the eleventh amendment bars suits for
monetary relief brought by individuals against entities or officials who are so closely related to
the state as to make the state the real party in interest. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 338 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781 (1978); Mount Healthy City School Dist.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).
151. The advantages of official recognition at TAMU included the following: (1) use of
campus facilities; (2) campus advertising; (3) availability of students activities' funds; (4) use of
office area; (5) assistance in preparing a budget; (6) secretarial services; (7) authorization to
hold meetings and functions on campus; (8) free use of university meeting rooms and facilities;
(9) free use of banking facilities at the Student Finance Center; and (10) use of an organization
mailbox. 737 F.2d at 1319.
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under section 1983. The district court upheld the denial of recognition on
the strength of its conclusion that GSS was not denied recognition based on
the homosexual content of its message but because of TAMU's long standing
tradition of not officially recognizing fraternal and social groups whose
message was one of mere friendship and personal affinity. 152 The court of
appeals reasoned that little or no evidence in the record supported the dis-
trict court's finding and concluded that the evidence presented at trial
clearly established that the sole reason for denying official recognition to
GSS was the content of its message and, therefore, GSS's first amendment
rights were infringed.1 53
Having found a violation of GSS's constitutional rights, the court next
applied the test that it had announced in University of Southern Mississippi
Chapter of the Mississippi Civil Liberties Union v. University of Southern Mis-
sissippi'5 4 to determine whether the abridgment of the students' constitu-
tional rights in the instant case was justified. In University of Southern
Mississippi the Fifth Circuit stated that students' rights of free expression
may be prohibited only if they materially and substantially interfere with the
need for appropriate discipline in the operation of the school; any restriction
by a school of future speech and activities is tantamount to a prior restraint
and carries a heavy presumption against its constitutionality.15 5 Recogniz-
ing the presumption that TAMU had to overcome, the court examined
TAMU's reasons for denying recognition. Supported by the United States
Supreme Court opinion in Healy v. James,156 the court held that the fact
that the homosexual nature and philosophy of GSS was at odds with that of
TAMU was an insufficient reason to withhold recognition. 157 Second, the
court concluded that because no Texas law made it a crime to be a homosex-
ual as opposed to conducting homosexual acts, 158 and since no evidence of
152. TAMU argued that for over 100 years it had not included national social fraternities
and sororities as part of its program in order to avoid a social caste system and to promote a
concept of togetherness. Id. at 1321. The Fifth Circuit held that the conclusion of the district
court assumed that the purpose for organizing GSS was to provide a message of friendship and
personal affinity that was utterly at odds with the group's stated purpose of providing informa-
tion on gay issues to gay persons and the general public. Id. at 1322. The court emphasized
that not only was the assertion that offical recognition was denied on the basis of GSS fraternal
message not raised at trial, but such a conclusion was completely in contradiction with the
evidence presented at trial. Id. The court pointed out that the Vice President for Student
Affairs never mentioned in his letter denying recognition any reason for that denial other than
the homosexual nature of the group. Id. In addition, the TAMU Board of Regents passed a
resolution in support of the vice president's position, stating that the policy position of TAMU
was to defend the lawsuit at all costs because the gay activities ran counter to the traditions
and standards of TAMU.
153. Id. at 1324, 1334.
154. 452 F.2d 564, 565 (5th Cir. 1971) (denial of official recognition to Mississippi Civil
Liberties Union violated first amendment).
155. Id. at 566 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)).
156. 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972) (state college could not withhold recognition from members
of local chapter of Students for Democratic Society on the basis that the organization's philos-
ophy was antithetical to school policies).
157. 737 F.2d at 1327.
158. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974) makes it a crime to engage in deviate
sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex. The court noted that this statute was
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illegal activity resulting from the existence of GSS was available, any claim
that recognition was withheld on the basis that GSS would incite such illegal
behavior was also insufficient to overcome the presumption that the infringe-
ment was unjustified.1 59 The court also found TAMU's assertion that the
education of students and speeches to the public were better left to the staff
and faculty of the university insufficient to justify infringement of constitu-
tional rights.16 0
The court finally turned to the district court's holding that TAMU never
created a public forum open to first amendment discourse and, therefore, no
first amendment violation had occurred. On the basis of its conclusion that
GSS was a social and fraternal group, the district court reasoned that be-
cause TAMU had traditionally denied official recognition to such groups, it
had never created a public forum to which GSS could be denied access. 161
The court of appeals reasoned that GSS was not a social and fraternal group
and, therefore, even if TAMU had not opened a general public forum to all
such fraternal groups, it had at least opened a limited public forum to certain
groups similar to GSS and it could not deny GSS access to that forum absent
a compelling reason. 162  The court failed to find a compelling reason for
denial of official recognition to GSS sufficient to justify an abridgment of
GSS's constitutional rights and held that although such denial was a consti-
tutional violation entitling it to relief under section 1983, GSS could not
recover damages against TAMU because of the application of the eleventh
amendment to the instant case.' 63 The court cited Zen tgraf v. Texas A&M
University' 64 in holding that TAMU was an alter ego of the state and, there-
held unconstitutional in Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1144 (N.D. Tex. 1982), and an
appeal is presently pending in the Fifth Circuit. 737 F.2d at 1321 n.5.
159. 737 F.2d at 1328; see also Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 588 F.2d 848, 853, 856
(8th Cir. 1977) (testimony as to recognition of Gay Lib causing probable violations of Missouri
sodomy law insufficient to justify infringement of first amendment rights), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1080, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 981 (1978); Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d
162, 166 (4th Cir. 1976) (absence of evidence that gay group was organized to carry out illegal
activities defeated argument that group's recognition would increase opportunity for illegal
homosexual conduct); Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir. 1974) (as-
serted interest in preventing illegal deviate sex acts insufficient to justify impairment of group's
first amendment rights).
160. 737 F.2d at 1329.
161. In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 794
(1983), the Supreme Court distinguished public forums from limited public forums. States
generally cannot prohibit expression, except for reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tions, in public forums. States can restrict a limited public forum to certain groups discussing
certain subjects. Id. at 955 n.7, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 805 n.7.
162. 737 F.2d at 1332. The court emphasized that TAMU had recognized certain other
service groups similar to GSS and has given them the benefits of recognition, thereby creating
at least a limited public forum. Id. at 1332; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68
(1981) (state-supported university that opens facilities to student groups may not exclude a
particular group absent compelling reason); Ysleta Fed'n of Teachers v. Ysleta Indep. School
Dist., 720 F.2d 1429, 1432, 1433 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal mailbox system in school district
constituted limited public forum and access could not be denied to organizations similar to
those given access without compelling reason justifying such denial).
163. 737 F.2d at 1333.
164. 492 F. Supp. 265, 271-72 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (sex discrimination suit against TAMU
barred by eleventh amendment because TAMU was alter ego of state).
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fore, immune under the eleventh amendment from a suit of damages. 165 Ac-
cordingly, the case was remanded for entry of appropriate declaratory and
injunctive relief. 166
IV. TAXATION, ANNEXATION, AND INCORPORATION
Few significant cases were decided in this area during the survey period.
In American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County167 the court of appeals was
asked to decide whether a taxpayer may enjoin the collection of an ad
valorem tax assessed on the shares of a banking corporation because the
method of assessment was held illegal by the United States Supreme
Court.1 68 Disregarding the illegality of the method of assessment, the Dallas
court of appeals held that the failure of the taxpayer to present evidence that
it had suffered substantial injury from the illegal assessment precluded the
issuance of injunctive relief. 169 The appellants contended that the lower
court demonstrated substantial injury by virtue of its conclusion that the
proper method of assessment was to tax a percentage of the book value of
the bank shares, which would result in a lower tax assessment. 170 The court
of appeals disagreed, reasoning that the applicable statute required the bank
shares to be taxed at their actual cash value, which the court interpreted to
mean their fair market value rather than book value. 17 1 To establish sub-
165. 737 F.2d at 1333-34.
166. Id. at 1334.
167. 679 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ). This case was one of several on
remand from the United States Supreme Court. The Court overruled a Dallas court of appeals
holding that the taxation of shares of a banking corporation for ad valorem tax purposes vio-
lated federal law by using the equity capital formula in computing the tax due on such shares.
See Bank of Texas v. Childs, 615 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct.
3369, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1983). 31 U.S.C. 742 (1976), as amended, provides that federal
obligations shall be exempt from -[e]very form of [state or local] taxation that would require
that either the obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly,
in the computation of the tax .... " Id. The equity capital formula computes the tax due on
bank shares by determining the amount of the bank's capital assets minus its liabilities and
value of its real estate holdings, and dividing that figure by the number of bank shares out-
standing. The Supreme Court held that the failure of the taxing authorities to deduct from the
equity capital formula the amount of federal obligations held by the bank rendered the assess-
ment illegal in violation of § 3701. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 103 S. Ct.
3369, 3373, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1072, 1077 (1983).
168. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 103 S. Ct. 3369, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1072
(1983). The statute that provided for the imposition of the tax assessment was former TEX.
TAX. CODE ANN. art. 7166 (Vernon 1960), repealed and superceded by TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§§ 21.09, 22.06, 23.11, 25.14 (Vernon 1982).
169. 679 S.W.2d at 574-75; see City of Arlington v. Cannon, 153 Tex. 566, 271 S.W.2d 414
(1954) (taxpayer not entitled to injunctive relief because he had not shown he would suffer
substantial injury as a result of a tax scheme that had been held fundamentally erroneous,
arbitrary, and illegal).
170. Book value of bank shares is determined by computing the equity capital formula and
deducting from that result the amount of federal obligations held by the bank. 679 S.W.2d at
570.
171. Id. Repealed article 7166 (Vernon 1960) provided that bank shares should be taxed at
their actual cash value, but did not direct how that value should be computed. The court
emphasized that the term value as used in TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 and other tax statutes
has been held to mean reasonable cash market value. 679 S.W.2d at 570; see, e.g., Whelan v.
State, 155 Tex. 14, 282 S.W.2d 378 (1955); Jones v. Hutchinson County, 615 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ); see also Polk County v. Tenneco, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 772
1985]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
stantial injury entitling it to injunctive relief, the appellant had to show that
a tax assessment based on the fair market value of the shares would be lower
than the illegal assessment. 17 2 Because the taxpayers had not met this bur-
den, the court held that the trial court had properly denied the injunction. 17 3
The San Antonio court of appeals held in Trevino v. Starr County17 4 that
the trial court erred in granting the appellee's motion to appoint a receiver
over 4,800 acres of land to execute oil and gas leases. Starr County con-
tended that the language of article 2293 7 5 providing for appointment of a
receiver by a creditor to subject any property or fund to his claim' 76 was
sufficient authority for granting its motion. The court of appeals disagreed
with the appellees' position and cited the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in
Carter v. Hightower. 17 7 In Hightower the supreme court limited the applica-
tion of article 2293 to property or a fund of a debtor upon which a creditor
has a specific lien. 1 7 8 The Trevino court vacated the trial court's receivership
because the appellee had offered no evidence to establish its lien for delin-
quent taxes with respect to the property.' 79
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port
Arthur 80 that a prior state proceeding that established that the city's annex-
ation of the subject property was not unconstitutional operated as res judi-
cata as to a subsequent federal court action asserting the unconstitutionality
of the annexation. 18 1 By a series of annexation ordinances, the city had an-
nexed certain oil and gas properties leased by the appellant from the state
and located approximately ten and one-half miles into the Gulf of Mex-
ico. 18 2 The annexations resulted in an annual ad valorem tax on the appel-
lant of about $775,000 a year. The appellant claimed that the annexation
constituted a taking of its property without due process because the act re-
sulted in a tax with no corresponding municipal benefits. The district court
agreed with the appellant and held that the prior state court proceedings had
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1935, writ dism'd) (book value is improper measure of taxable value
when evidence shows it is different from market value).
172. 679 S.W.2d at 574. The court expressly stated that not only did the appellant have the
burden of proving the illegal assessment, which they had done, but appellant also was required
to show that the proper method of assessing the shares at market value would have been fair
less than the assessment. Id. The court also noted that the Supreme Court had not held the
statute in question unconstitutional, but only the method of its application. Id.
173. Id. at 574-75. Although appellant was denied injunctive relief in the instant case, the
court modified the judgment of the trial court by ruling that the tax assessment for which it
denied relief from collection was, in fact, illegal and arbitrary. Id. at 575.
174. 660 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ dism'd).
175. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2293 (Vernon 1971).
176. Id.
177. 79 Tex. 135, 15 S.W. 223 (1890); accord Pelton v. First Nat'l Bank, 400 S.W.2d 398
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1966, no writ).
178. 79 Tex. at 137, 15 S.W. at 224.
179. 660 S.W.2d at 142.
180. 726 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984).
181. Id. at 206-07.
182. The ordinances complied with TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970(a) (Vernon
1963), which sets forth the procedure for municipal annexation. See City of Longview v. State
ex rel. Spring Hill Util. Dist., 657 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. 1983) (annexation of water district by city
in a series of ordinances did not violate article 970(a)).
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no res judicata effect on the federal court proceedings.183
The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and held that
pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Act184 the district court was bound to
give effect to the prior state court judgments if a state court would give such
effect to the judgment.185 Citing the rule announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,' 8 6 the court
sought to determine whether Texas law would give the same preclusive effect
to the prior state court proceeding.18 7 Emphasizing that a Texas judge had
relied on the prior judgment in affirming a collateral state court summary
judgment proceeding, 188 the Fifth Circuit held that the prior judgment in the
quo warranto action barred the relief sought by the appellant on the grounds
of res judicata.18 9
In City of Heath v. King' 90 several voters brought suit to compel disannex-
ation of five tracts of land from the appellant city.' 9 ' The jury found that
the city had failed to furnish certain services to the subject property that
were comparable to the services furnished to other portions of the city. The
city argued that, because section 10(A) of article 970(a) had been amended
in 1981 and the provisions of the earlier statute upon which the appellees
relied were omitted, the appellees' remedy to compel disannexation had been
repealed. The court rejected this contention because the caption of the bill
from which the amendment was derived failed to mention that it affected the
rights of the state citizens with respect to disannexation privileges or that it
was designed to repeal a part of the prior statute by omission.' 9 2 In addi-
tion, the court interpreted the prefatory phrase "[flrom and after the effec-
tive date" of the 1981 amendment to evidence a legislative intent that the
prior statute be given full force and effect with respect to disannexations
183. 535 F. Supp. 916, 921 (E.D. Tex. 1982).
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) provides that state "judicial proceedings ... shall have the
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or
usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are taken."
185. 726 F.2d at 206.
186. 456 U.S. 461 (1982). In Kremer the Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1982) requires federal courts to give res judicata effect to a state court judgment if the state
courts would give such effect to the judgment. 456 U.S. at 466.
187. 726 F.2d at 206.
188. In Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 628 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 802 (1982), the court of appeals affirmed the summary judg-
ment order issued by the state district court in favor of the City of Port Arthur with respect to
its state court action challenging the constitutionality of the annexation. 628 S.W.2d at 98.
189. 726 F.2d at 206-07.
190. 665 S.W.2d 133 (Tex App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
191. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 970(a), § 10 (1962) provides the procedure under
which voters may seek to compel disannexation from a municipal corporation that has failed
to act on a properly presented petition for disannexation.
192. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 35 provides that no bill shall contain a subject that is not
expressed in its title. The caption of the instant amendment read as follows: "An act relating
to annexation of providing services to, and disannexation of certain areas." 665 S.W.2d at 135.
See Stauffer v. City of San Antonio, 162 Tex. 13, 344 S.W.2d 158 (1961), and Oakley v. Kent,
181 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1944, no writ), in which statutes were held invalid due
to their captions' failure to give notice that they affected a change in existing substantive law.
Cf. Globe Indem. Co. v. Barnes, 280 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1926, no writ) (statute
held invalid for failure to give notice in caption that it repealed current law).
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commenced prior to the amendment. 19 3 Using this interpretation, the court
construed the statute as constitutional. 19 4 Finding that testimony establish-
ing the disparity of police services, mowing of right-of-ways, and street
maintenance services was sufficient to support the judgment against the city,
the court affirmed the trial court's judgment granting the order compelling
disannexation. 195
V. ELECTIONS AND ELECTED OFFICIALS
In State ex rel. Hightower v. Smith 19 6 the Texas Supreme Court held that
the state's allegations, that the sheriff of Smith County had appropriated
county gasoline and patrol cars for his own use in connection with the ex-
change of security services for a rent-free apartment, gave the sheriff suffi-
cient notice of the charges against him to comply with the requirements of
the removal statute for official misconduct. 19 7 The court of appeals reversed
the order of the district court removing the sheriff from office on the basis of
a jury finding that the sheriff had misappropriated county property. 198 The
court of appeals held that the pleadings and issues were not specific enough
to apprise the defendant of the charges against him.199 Smith contended
that because removal from office is a quasi-criminal proceeding, strict con-
struction of the statutes was required.
The supreme court held that specifying particular dates upon which the
particular acts of misconduct occurred was unnecessary to sufficiently in-
form the sheriff of the distinct cause for his removal and that the allegation
that such acts occurred on numerous occasions gave fair and adequate notice
as required by the statute. 2° The court accordingly reversed the decision of
the court of appeals and remanded the cause to consider the sheriff's chal-
lenge of the factual insufficiency of the evidence. 20 1
193. 665 S.W.2d at 136.
194. Id.; see Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1974) (statute should be interpreted so
as to render it constitutional whenever possible).
195. 665 S.W.2d at 137.
196. 671 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. 1984).
197. Id. at 34. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.01(a)(5) (Vernon 1974) prohibits taking or
misapplying anything of value belonging to the government. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5977 (Vernon 1962) provides that a removal petition for removal of a public official for misap-
propriation of public property "shall set forth in plain and intelligible words the causes alleged
as the grounds of removal, giving of each instance, with as much certainty as the nature of the
case will admit of, the time and place of occurrence of the alleged acts ...... Article 5978
provides that the trial judge shall instruct the jury to state which cause for removal is true and
correct as determined by the evidence. Id. art. 5978.
198. 671 S.W.2d 48, 50-51 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983), rev'd, 671 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. 1984).
199. 671 S.W.2d at 50.
200. 671 S.W.2d at 34-35.
201. Id. at 36. The cause was remanded to consider Smith's challenge to the evidence
supporting the jury's finding of willfulness on the issue of misconduct. Id. The court of ap-
peals has exclusive jurisdiction over this issue. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6; see also Hurst v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 647 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983) (requiring remand to determine sufficiency
of evidence). In considering Smith's challenge on remand, the Tyler court of appeals found
that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the sheriff's
misconduct was willful. 673 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ).
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In Painter v. Shaner20 2 the appellant was denied a place on the ballot be-
cause the county party chairman had been unavailable to accept appellant's
otherwise timely and properly filed application. 20 3 The court of appeals held
that the appellant's name could not be placed on the ballot because "[t]he
election statutes pertaining to candidates are mandatory and strict compli-
ance is required.' ' 2°4 The supreme court reversed, reasoning that to deny a
candidate a place on the ballot as a result of a third party's absence from the
designated place for filing could result in abuse of the system and frustrate
the general policy of fair elections. 20 5 The supreme court, therefore, ordered
that the appellant's name be placed on the ballot.206
The Corpus Christi court of appeals held in Dodd v. Wyatt20 7 that the
provisions of the Texas Election Code with respect to candidates are
mandatory. 20 8 A write-in Democratic candidate for county judge was, there-
fore, properly defeated when voters marked a straight Democratic ticket but
also wrote in the appellant's name.209 The applicable statute stated that if
two or more names are upon the same ballot, but only one person is to be
elected to the office, such ballot shall not be counted. 210
202. 667 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 1984).
203. The appellant personally delivered his application to the office of the county chairman
45 minutes prior to the deadline. Upon being informed that the chairman was at his business
location, the appellant delivered the application at that location two hours after the filing dead-
line. The secretary of state had advised the chairman that the late application failed to comply
with Texas law and, consequently, the chairman chose not to place the appellant's name on the
ballot. Id. at 124.
204. 667 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tex. App.-El Paso), rev'd, 667 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 1984). Provi-
sions of the Texas Election Code relating to voters are to be liberally construed as directory
only, but those provisions relating to the requirements of a candidate for office are mandatory
and require strict compliance. See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 377 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. 1964)
(candidate who sent his assessment by first class mail rather than certified or registered mail
properly denied slot on ballot); Shields v. Upham, 597 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1980, no writ) (failure of nominating petition to show street address or county in which
voter was registered to show street address or county in which voter was registered to vote
held insufficient compliance); Geiger v. Debusk, 534 S.W.2d 437, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1976, no writ) (failure to attach affidavit in lieu of filing fee resulted in withdrawal of name
from ballot); McWaters v. Tucker, 249 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1952, no
writ) (failure to accompany request to be placed on ballot with a loyalty affidavit not fatal).
205. 667 S.W.2d at 125.
206. Id.; see also Bayne v. Glisson, 300 So. 2d 79, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (the denial
of a candidate's place on the ballot when the applicant has otherwise exercised due diligence
but is delayed beyond deadline through no fault of his own is improper and has the effect of
shortening the filing deadline).
207. 656 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ dism'd).
208. Id. at 565.
209. Id. at 566.
210. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 8.21 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1985); see Duncan v. Willis,
157 Tex. 316, 302 S.W.2d 627 (1957); Mollins v. Powell 273 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1954, no writ); see also Johnson v. Peters, 260 S.W. 911, 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1924, no writ) (predecessor statute held to require that a ballot cannot be counted if it
contains a vote for two persons and only one office); Wright v. Marquis 255 S.W. 637, 638-39
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1923, no writ) (ballot shall not be counted when two names are
written in for same office). In a similar strict compliance case, the Forth Worth court of
appeals held that although the Texas Election Code does not specify to whom or to what entity
a candidate's filing fee check should be made payable, a check made payable to the State
Democratic Executive Primary Committee instead of the local county Democratic party did
not constitute strict compliance with the Code; requiring that the candidate's name be placed
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In Jones v. City of Lubbock2 11 the Fifth Circuit held that the City of Lub-
bock's "at large" voting scheme2 12 used in electing the mayor and the city
council did not violate the fifteenth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution,21 3 but did violate the recently amended Voting Rights Act.21 4 The
Fifth Circuit had returned Jones to the district court 2 15 for reconsideration
in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Rogers v. Lodge.2 16 On remand
the district court concluded that, based on evidence presented at trial, the
City of Lubbock had established a voting system originally motivated by
purposeful discrimination and that resulted in a denial of equal access of
minority groups to the political process, thereby violating the fifteenth
amendment and the Voting Rights Act.2 17 On appeal the Fifth Circuit held
that although a violation of the Voting Rights Act may be established upon a
showing that a voting scheme has a discriminatory result, a violation of the
fifteenth amendment required a showing of purposeful discrimination in es-
tablishing the system.2 18 The court held that evidence that a member of the
on the ballot by writ of mandamus was, therefore, inappropriate. Leach v. Fischer, 669
S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
211. 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1984).
212. An at large system is a system by which all voters in the city elect a certain number of
members to the city council without regard to the district in which the voter resides. Appel-
lant alleged that this procedure had the effect of diluting the minority vote from districts that
were predominantly occupied by minorities. Id. at 367.
213. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. The fifteenth amendment forbids the states from denying or
abridging the right of a U.S. citizen to exercise his privilege to vote. Id.
214. 727 F.2d at 386-87. See Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982), which provides
that a state or political subdivision cannot deny, on account of race or color, a citizen's right to
vote. Such a denial occurs when certain classes have less opportunity than other citizens to
elect representatives of their choice. Id.
215. 640 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981). The district court originally found that, although the
evidence showed discriminatory effect from the application of the at large system, the respon-
siveness of the city to minority needs along with other factors supported a holding in favor of
the city. The Fifth Circuit originally remanded the case to the district court for reconsidera-
tion in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which
reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that a denial of access to the political process claim brought
by a minority required a showing of an intent to discriminate. Id. at 66-71. This holding
repudiated the previous view of the Fifth Circuit that objective indicia could be used to show
intentional voting dilution. See Nevette v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 217-29 (5th Cir. 1978). The
Fifth Circuit withdrew its original mandate pending the outcome of another voting dilution
case, Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
216. 458 U.S. 613 (1982). In Rogers the Supreme Court upheld the requirement that vot-
ing dilution claims required a showing of intent, but concluded that intent could be shown by
objective indicia of discrimination. Id. at 622-27.
217. While the district court was reconsidering the Jones case on remand from the Fifth
Circuit, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to overrule the Supreme Court's holding in
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), and to provide expressly that objective indicia of dis-
crimination can be used to establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act.
218. 727 F.2d at 369 (citing Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)); see also Personnel
Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275-76 (1979) (disproportionate impact of civil service exam
requirement will not support equal protection claim without showing of discriminatory mo-
tive); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (discriminatory result of language test
insufficient to establish equal protection violation in absence of discriminatory motive); accord
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977). The
Fifth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), had
expressly indicated that the issue of whether a violation of the fifteenth amendment requires
the same showing of purposeful discrimination as a fourteenth amendment violation was un-
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original commission enacting the city's at large system was the editor of a
local paper that ran a series of vile racial slurs was too remote and tenuous to
support the inference that the entire original commission was biased and,
consequently, the original voting scheme was enacted with a discriminatory
motive.
21 9
With respect to the Voting Rights Act, the court initially held that the
1983 amendment was a legitimate exercise of congressional power and, thus,
not unconstitutional.220 After tracing the history of case law interpreting
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments with respect to discrimination
claims,221 the court rejected the appellant's claim that the 1983 amendment
to the Voting Rights Act required an actual showing of subjective discrimi-
natory motive to establish a violation of its provisions.222 The court con-
cluded that the 1983 amendment clearly requires only a showing of
discriminatory result to prove that a voting scheme violates the Voting
Rights Act, but that a violation of the fifteenth amendment requires a show-
ing of discriminatory motive. 223 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision as to the violation of the Voting Rights Act, but reversed the
lower court insofar as the decision found the at large system violative of the
fifteenth amendment. 22
4
VI. OPEN RECORDS ACT AND OPEN MEETINGS ACT
Only one significant case interpreting the Texas Open Records Act 22 5 was
clear, but its opinion rested on the assumption that the standard for a violation of either
amendment was purposeful discrimination. 727 F.2d at 370.
219. 727 F.2d at 371, 372.
220. Id. at 373-75. The court rejected a challenge that the standards set forth in the Voting
Rights Act were unconstitutionally vague on the basis that the concept of a statute being void
for vagueness applies only to the effect a statute has on conduct. Id. at 373; see Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). The court reasoned that the amendment did not
have the effect of regulating conduct but only defining what acts would suffice to show a viola-
tion under the Voting Rights Act. 727 F.2d at 372-73. The court also rejected the contention
that the amendment constituted an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power by interpret-
ing the constitution, a function exclusively. within the province of the judiciary. Id. at 374.
The court held that the amendment could be justified on grounds that Congress was acting to
enforce the provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Id. at 375; see City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 173 (1980).
221. 727 F.2d at 376, 380. The court's discussion treats the case law in three distinct
stages: (1) pre-Bolden law that required a showing of only discriminatory effect; (2) Bolden,
which required a showing of discriminatory motive; and (3) the amendment to the Voting
Rights Act, which overruled Bolden and reinstated the pre-Bolden status quo.
222. Id. at 375. The Court relied on the inclusion within the amendment of many of the
objective factors listed in the Fifth Circuit opinion of Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297
(5th Cir. 1974). In Zimmer the court held that objective criteria could be used to show intent
to discriminate. Id. at 1305.
223. 727 F.2d at 375.
224. Id. at 387. The court left intact the district court's redistricting plan as a remedy for
the city's Voting Rights Act violation. The district court had ordered that the city establish
and implement a voting scheme whereby the voters would elect council members from six
different districts. Id. at 386.
225. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(a), §§ 1-15 (Vernon Supp. 1985). Section
3(a) of the Act provides that "[a]ll information collected, assembled, or maintained by govern-
mental bodies" shall be available for public inspection unless expressly exempted for the cover-
age of the statute. Id. § 3(a).
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decided during the survey period. In City of Houston v. Houston Chronicle
Publishing Co. 226 the appellant sought to compel the Houston police depart-
ment, by writ of mandamus, to produce certain records pertaining to its op-
eration of the local city jail.227 The city argued that a writ of mandamus was
improper and premature because it had agreed to comply with the request,
subject to its prior review and editing of exempted information under the
Act.228 The city also contended that the action was premature because the
city was awaiting a response from the office of the attorney general as to
whether the requested information was subject to the applicable exemption
under the Act.229
The court rejected the city's argument and held that mandamus was a
proper remedy because the city was not entitled to request an opinion of the
attorney general in this instance 230 and the city's offer to supply the informa-
tion subject to edit and review failed to comply with the provisions of the
Act.231 In support of its conclusion, the court found that the city failed to
produce promptly the records or to designate a specific date and hour when
the records would be made available, as required by section 4 of the Act. 232
This failure amounted to a refusal to disclose public information that enti-
tled the requesting party to seek a remedy of mandamus.233 Second, the city
was not entitled to seek an opinion of the attorney general's office as to the
availability of an exemption for the requested information because it had
already been found to be public information subject to disclosure in an ear-
lier case. 234 The court, therefore, modified the trial court's judgment to ex-
226. 673 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
227. If a public governmental unit refuses to disclose information that is subject to disclo-
sure under the Open Records Act, then a petition for writ of mandamus may be sought to
compel disclosure of such information. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(a), § 8
(Vernon Supp. 1985).
228. The city argued that the portion of the material requested that related to an individ-
ual's personal history and arrest record was exempt from disclosure under § 3(a)(8) of the Act,
which pertains to information obtained and used in connection with the detection and investi-
gation of a crime. See Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177,
184-85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The city also argued that
the requested information contained exempt material under § 3(a)(l) of the Act, which per-
tains to information deemed confidential by law.
229. Section 7 of the Act allows the governmental unit that receives a request for disclosure
of public information to request an opinion of the attorney general of the state as to whether
the information is subject to an exemption under the Act or must be disclosed as requested.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(a), § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1985). Section 3(a) of the Act
provides eight categories of information that are excepted from disclosure. Id. § 3(a). The city
argued that the requested information was exempt from disclosure under either § 3(a)(1) or (8)
of the Act.
230. 673 S.W.2d at 318-19. The thrust of the city's argument was that a § 8 writ of manda-
mus is predicated on a refusal to supply the requested information and the city had not refused
the request but actually had agreed to supply subject to edit and review and the receipt of an
opinion from ,the attorney general.
231. Id. at 319.
232. Id. Section 4 requires the custodian to produce the requested information promptly; if
the requested information is not immediately available, the custodian must certify that fact and
set a date and hour within a reasonable time from the request when the information will be
made available. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(a), § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
233. 673 S.W.2d at 319.
234. Id. at 318; see Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-133 (1982). The court stated that a custodian is
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clude only a portion of the information previously determined
nondisclosable and otherwise affirmed the issuance of the writ of
mandamus.
2 3 5
In Common Cause v. Metropolitan Transit Authority236 the Houston court
of appeals reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellee
because the evidence raised a fact issue as to whether the provision of the
Open Meetings Act that requires advance notice for all non-emergency
meetings237 had been substantially complied with.238 The Texas Legisla-
ture's 1975 amendment to the Act required that the notice be posted for a
seventy-two hour period in a place "readily accessible to the general public
at all times."'239 The court held that although appellee produced evidence
that the notice had been posted for the statutory period, summary judgment
was improper because the notice was not shown to have been posted in a
readily accessible place as required by the Act.240
not authorized to withhold information merely because he considers it exempt from disclosure,
but must, in the absence of a previous applicable decision holding the information exempt,
disclose the information immediately or seek an opinion of the attorney general. 673 S.W.2d
at 318. The court also concluded that the requested information was presumed to be public
information because the city had failed to seek an attorney general's opinion as to a specific
exemption for the information within 10 days after it had received the request for disclosure.
Id. at 324. Although Chief Justice Evans agreed with the majority decision that the city was
not entitled to withhold or delay delivery of the information in the instant case, he disagreed
with the majority conclusion that because the city had made an improper request of the attor-
ney general as to the disclosable status of the requested information, such improper request
amounted to a presumption that the information was public and, therefore, subject to disclo-
sure under the act. Id. at 325 (Evans, C.J., concurring).
235. 673 S.W.2d at 324. The court agreed with the city that the information pertaining to
an individual's personal history and arrest record was subject to exemption from disclosure
and, therefore, appropriately excluded that information from its order compelling the city to
disclose the information requested by the appellee. Id. at 318-19.
236. 666 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1984, no writ).
237. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, §§ 1-4 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
238. 666 S.W.2d at 612. Section 3A of the Act provides that notice of a meeting, other
than an emergency meeting, that is subject to the provisions of the Act must be posted for at
least 72 hours preceding the scheduled time of the meeting. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-17, § 3A (Vernon Supp. 1985).
239. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3A(h) (Vernon Supp. 1985). In Lips-
comb Indep. School Dist. v. County School Trustees, 498 S.W.2d 364 (rex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1983, writ refd n.r.e.), the court held that notice posted for 72 hours preceding a
meeting complied with § 3A(h) even when the courthouse where the notice was posted had
remained locked for at least two-thirds of the 72 hours. Id. at 366-67. The attorney general
criticized the Lipscomb decision and predicted that the Texas Supreme Court would hold
otherwise if squarely confronted with the Lipscomb notice question. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen.
No. H-419 (1974). The attorney general's opinion precipitated the 1975 amendment to § 3A.
240. 666 S.W.2d at 613. The court stated that although the greater weight of Texas case
law held that strict compliance with the Act was unnecessary and that substantial compliance
with the Act would suffice, the issue of substantial compliance was a fact question and, there-
fore, summary judgment was improper. Id.; see Coates v. Windham, 613 S.W.2d 572, 577
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ); McConnell v. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist.,
576 S.W.2d 470, 474-75 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stelzer v. Hud-
dleston, 526 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ dism'd). Contra Cameron
County Good Gov't League v. Ramon, 619 S.W.2d 224, 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont




One of the more interesting Fifth Circuit decisions rendered during the
survey period was Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston,241 in which the
appellant alleged that the mayor of Houston and several successful appli-
cants for cable television franchise permits had engaged in an unlawful con-
spiracy in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.2 42 The mayor and the
City of Houston allowed the major cable operators to carve up the local
territory and present to the city a franchise distribution plan already agreed
to among themselves, rather than to submit to a competitive bidding pro-
cess.2 4 3 A report prepared by a neutral third-party cable consultant criti-
cized the city's method of allowing the competitors amicably to divide up the
local market and recommended the rejection of three of the five successful
applicants. Affiliated submitted its bid to the city shortly after the local mar-
ket had been divided between the successful applicants and was told by the
city council to work something out with the already successful applicants.
When the appellant could not reach agreement with the successful appli-
cants, it filed suit in district court alleging an unlawful conspiracy in unrea-
sonable restraint of trade.
Although the jury found that the mayor, the city, and one of the success-
ful applicants had engaged in a conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade
and such conspiracy caused injury to the plaintiff, the district court granted
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendants on the basis
of the jury's finding that the private agreements to divide the local market
did not constitute an unlawful conspiracy. 244 The court of appeals initially
held that the granting of the judgment n.o.v. was improper because the evi-
dence presented in favor of the defendants was not so overwhelming that
reasonable men could not arrive at the verdict reached by the jury. 24 5 The
court found that the appellant had presented substantial circumstantial evi-
dence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn to support the
jury's findings that the conspiracy between the mayor, the city, and one of
the successful applicants was the proximate cause of appellant's failure to be
awarded a franchise and, therefore, judgment n.o.v. was improper as to
241. 735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984).
242. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The Act states that "[e]very contract combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
243. The court emphasized that the applicants were not selected on the merit of their pro-
posals, but the political strength of the businessmen backing them. 735 F.2d at 1557.
244. 519 F. Supp. 991, 997-98 (E.D. Tex. 1981). The trial judge apparently reasoned that
plaintiff's injury was solely attributable to the boundary line agreements made between the
various applicants and not the conspiracy entered into between the mayor, the city, and the
successful applicants. Id. at 1009.
245. 735 F.2d at 1563; see Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (when facts
and inferences point so strongly in favor of one party that reasonable men could not arrive at a
contrary verdict, judgment n.o.v. is proper; if substantial evidence is contrary to motion for
judgment n.o.v. such that reasonable men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach
different conclusions, the motion should be denied); accord Bazile v. Bisso Marine Co., 606




The court also determined that the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 247 pro-
viding an exemption from the antitrust liability when the alleged conspiracy
is the result of a private citizen's genuine good faith attempt to influence
government, was inapplicable to the instant case.248 The Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine embodies the concept that private citizens may petition govern-
ment in support of their own interests.249 Such petitioning in itself may re-
sult in an elimination of competition from the market place, but the doctrine
is inapplicable when the public official being petitioned is found to be a part
of the conspiracy.250 The court determined that although the mayor, the
city, and one of the successful applicants had engaged in a conspiracy in
unreasonable restraint of trade that caused the appellant injury, the mayor
was entitled to qualified immunity2 51 under the standard established by the
United States Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.2 52 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that because at the time of the conspiracy public officials were not
necessarily held liable for antitrust violations when they allowed noncompet-
itive franchising to take place, the mayor could not be liable for damages as a
result of such conduct. 253 The court reversed the judgment n.o.v. with di-
rections that the district court enter judgment only against the applicant that
was a co-conspirator. 2 54
In Cortez v. State Bar of Texas25 5 the trial court granted the State Bar's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and permanently enjoined
Cortez from engaging in acts and practices constituting the unauthorized
practice of law. 256 In a case of first impression in Texas, the trial court con-
cluded that Cortez's actions in assisting immigrants to obtain permanent
residency within the United States constituted the unauthorized practice of
law as a matter of law and, therefore, judgment n.o.v. was appropriate. The
246. 735 F.2d at 1564-65. The court reasoned that "[t]he exclusive nature of the conspir-
acy itself and Affiliated's failure to obtain a franchise is circumstantial evidence from which the
jury could infer that the conspiracy operated to exclude Affiliated, a non-conspirator who was
very likely to have received a franchise through competition on the merits." Id. at 1564; see
also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 118 (1969) (trial judge may
properly infer damages from circumstantial evidence in antitrust conspiracy); Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 700 (1962) (jury may properly infer the
necessary causal connection between antitrust violations and plaintiff's injury).
247. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern RR. Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freights, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
248. 735 F.2d at 1566.
249. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freights, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961).
250. 735 F.2d at 1566.
251. Id. at 1568-69.
252. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In Harlow the court stated that government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable
person would be aware of. Id. at 814-15.
253. 735 F.2d at 1569-70.
254. Id. at 1570.
255. 674 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ granted).
256. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1 (Vernon Supp. 1985) provides that the state
bar association of Texas may seek an injunction preventing persons or entities from engaging
in the unauthorized practice of law.
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testimony at trial revealed that Cortez's assistance was limited to advising
immigrants as to which set of forms to fill out to obtain a preferential status
in the consideration for permanent residency within the United States.
The court of appeals determined that the critical issue was whether the
determination of what acts and practices constituted the unauthorized prac-
tice of law 2 5 7 was a question of fact within the province of the jury or a
question of law to be answered by the court.258 The court of appeals con-
cluded that because the undisputed evidence in the case was insufficient to
permit a holding as a matter of law that Cortez's acts amounted to the unau-
thorized practice of law, the question was properly one for the jury.25 9 The
court also rejected the appellee's contention that under article 320(a)(1), sec-
tion 19(a)260 the judge must determine as a matter of law whether the acts
in a particular case constitute the unauthorized practice of law.26 1 The court
interpreted the reference in the cited statute to the "judicial branch" having
the authority to determine what constitutes the practice of law as applying to
both judge and jury. 2 6 2 The court held that the facts of the particular case
prevented a finding as a matter of law and dissolved the permanent
injunction.263
In Hawthorne v. La-Man Constructors, Inc. 264 La-Man sought a writ of
mandamus ordering the Port Arthur Housing Authority to raise revenues to
satisfy a $135,000 judgment that La-Man had obtained against the housing
authority in June 1980.265 Concluding that the authority was under a clear
duty to satisfy the judgment after it became final, the court reasoned that the
257. In Davies v. State Bar of Texas, 431 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), the court stated that:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation, but also services rendered out of court, and includes the giving of
advice or the rendering of any service requiring the use of legal skill or knowl-
edge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of
which under the facts and conclusions involved must be carefully determined.
Id. at 593; see also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 19(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985)
(defining the practice of law).
258. 674 S.W.2d at 806.
259. Id. Although the court held that in the instant case the determination of what consti-
tutes the unauthorized practice of law was a question for the jury, it stated that "[w]e do not
hold that there may never be a case in which the undisputed evidence shows as a matter of law
that a person was engaged in the practice of law". Id. at 807.
260. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 19(a) (Vernon. Supp. 1985). This section
uses the definition in Davies v. State Bar of Texas for setting forth what acts constitute the
unauthorized practice of law. See supra note 257. The statute further provides that "[t]his
definition is not exclusive and does not deprive the judicial branch of the power and authority
both under this Act and the adjudicated cases to determine whether other services and acts not
enumerated in this Act may constitute the practice of law." TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
320a-1, § 19(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
261. 674 S.W.2d at 806.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 808.
264. 672 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, no writ).
265. The three requisite elements of mandamus relief are: (1) a legal duty to perform a
non-discretionary act; (2) a demand for performance of the non-discretionary act; and (3) a
refusal to perform the non-discretionary act after demand. Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843




remedy of mandamus or the appointment of a receiver were the only reme-
dies available to La-Man to collect its judgment. 266 Although mandamus is
generally an improper remedy when the action sought to be compelled is
within the discretion of a public official, the court found that an exception to
this general rule was applicable here, since the housing authority had abused
its discretion in failing to pay the outstanding judgment and La-Man had no
other adequate remedy at law.2 67 The court also found that the trial court's
order to raise revenues for purposes of satisfying the judgment 268 was clear
enough to support a motion for contempt if the housing authority failed to
comply.
26 9
Several Texas retail merchants sued the state in State v. Revco D.S.,
Inc. ,270 challenging the constitutionality of the state's "Blue Law, ' 2 7 1 which
prevents certain merchants from opening for business on consecutive Satur-
days and Sundays and selling certain merchandise on specified dates.272 The
Dallas court of appeals reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of
the retail merchants and remanded the cause for trial.2 7 3 The court found
that an expert's affidavit stating the negative effects of the Blue Law was
insufficient to meet the plaintiff's burden of establishing the unconstitutional-
ity of the statute as a matter of law, because the affidavit did not show "that
there is no reasonable relation between the law and the health, recreation,
and welfare of the people of the state. '274
In Otten v. Town of China Grove2 7 5 the trial court granted an injunction
prohibiting the operation of a horse-racing enterprise on appellant's private
property. China Grove argued that the injunction was proper because the
operation of the track constituted a public nuisance in violation of a town
ordinance prohibiting the racing of vehicles or animals and a state statute
declaring habitual gambling resorts a common nuisance.2 7 6 The court held
266. 672 S.W.2d at 258. A public corporation of the nature of the Port Arthur Housing
Authority is exempt from execution to satisfy a judgment rendered against it. Id.
267. Id. at 259; see Hereford v. Farrar, 469 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, writ
refd n.r.e.) (mandamus appropriate to require performance of discretionary act when abuse of
discretion not to perform and petitioner has no adequate remedy at law).
268. The court mentioned that the Authority could raise revenues through the issuance
and sale of bonds pursuant to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269K (Vernon 1963). 672
S.W.2d at 251-62.
269. 672 S.W.2d at 259; see Exparte Brooks, 604 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980,
no writ) (contempt order appropriate for disobeying court decree that is clear, specific, and
unambiguous).
270. 675 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
271. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 9001 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
272. Id.
273. 675 S.W.2d at 221. But see Gibson Distrib. Co. v. Downtown Dev. Ass'n of El Paso,
Inc., 572 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1000 (1978) (constitutionality of Texas
Blue Law upheld).
274. 675 S.W.2d at 221; see also State v. Spartan's Indus., Inc., 447 S.W.2d 407, 414 (Tex.
1969) (stating that court will declare statute unconstitutional only when it is clearly not within
the police power), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 590 (1970).
275. 660 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ dism'd).
276. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4664 (Vernon Supp. 1985) provides that any facility
at which the public shall "commonly resort . . . or where persons habitually resort for the
purpose of prostitution or to gamble. . . is hereby declared to be a common nuisance." Id.
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that because the legislature had never declared horse racing to be a nuisance
per se, the ordinance was void. 277 Although evidence was presented at trial
establishing the presence of gambling on the appellant's premises, the court
held that such evidence was insufficient to establish that the property was
used habitually for gambling and, therefore, the injunction was improper.278
In Safe Water Foundation of Texas v. City of Houston279 the Houston
court of appeals held that appellant's failure to overcome the presumed va-
lidity of an ordinance providing for the injection of flouridation into the city
water supply precluded injunctive relief prohibiting application of the ordi-
nance. 28 0 The court found that the city council had the duty to pass such
laws and ordinances as are in furtherance of the public health, safety, and
welfare. 281 The trial court's denial of injunctive relief was upheld because
the evidence did not indicate that the city had abused its discretion and acted
arbitrarily, unreasonably, and capriciously in exercising its police power to
enact the ordinance. 28 2
art. 4667 allows the state or a citizen to enjoin the habitual use of any premises for the pur-
poses prohibited by article 4664.
277. 660 S.W.2d at 567. Although TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1015, §§ 11, 28
(Vernon 1963) vest municipalities with the power to abate all nuisances affecting the public
health and "[t]o prevent, prohibit and suppress horse racing ... in the streets," the court did
not find a statute that defines horse racing as a nuisiance. 660 S.W.2d at 567; see Crossman v.
City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S.W.810 (Tex. 1923) (absent legislative sanction, city is
without authority to declare a nuisance that is not a nuisance either per se or at common law);
Sitterle v. Victoria, 33 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1930, writ dism'd) (munici-
pal ordinance that declares and denounces a nuisance that is not such per se or at common law
is invalid).
278. 660 S.W.2d at 568-69. The court held that evidence of occasion acts of gambling was
insufficient to show habitual use as defined in article 4667. See Lara v. State, 153 Tex. Crim.
84, 85, 217 S.W.2d 853, 854 (1949) (two acts of intercourse with another man's wife insuffi-
cient to show habitual intercourse necessary to sustain adultery conviction).
279. 661 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
280. Id. at 192. Local city ordinances are presumed valid unless the passing of an ordi-
nance is shown to be an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of police power and, therefore, an
abuse of discretion. Town of Ascarte v. Villalobos, 148 Tex. 254, 223 S.W.2d 945 (1949); City
of Clute v. Linscomb, 446 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, no writ).
281. 661 S.W.2d at 192. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5 vests municipalities with authority to
enact laws and ordinances that are in furtherance of the public health, safety, and welfare.
282. 661 S.W.2d at 192. The court rejected the city's cross point that the appellants lacked
standing to maintain the action and held that the appellants had standing on the basis that
they were taxpaying residents and consumers of the City of Houston's water supply. Id. at
193; see Texas Indus. Traffic League v. Railroad Comm'n, 628 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin), rev'd on other grounds, 633 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. 1982), in which Justice Powers gave an
excellent review of the background and present status of the law of standing in Texas.
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